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The present study examined the development of guilt and shame in preschool 
children, as well as individual differences related to the expression of these emotions. 
Sixty-one children in three age groups were videotaped in a mishap paradigm in which an 
experimentally manipulated doll's arm fell off during play. Children were randomly 
assigned to either an ambiguous or a personal responsibility condition. Videotapes were 
coded for behavioral (e.g., latency to repair, avoidance) and affective (e.g., joy, 
tensionlwony) reactions. Individual differences were assessed through parental reports 
using the My Child (Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putman, 1994) and teacher 
ratings using the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation Inventory (SCBE; 
LaFreniere, Dumas, Capuano, & Dubeau, 1992). 
As expected, 4-year-olds expressed fewer avoidant behaviors such as toy 
avoidance, experimenter avoidance than did 2 or 3-year-olds. Additionally, older 
preschoolers expressed more guilt-relevant emotions such as sadness and decreased joy, 
rather than shame-relevant emotions such as tension/worry, which were seen in younger 
preschoolers. Results of the responsibility manipulation were contrary to hypotheses. 
Children in the personal responsibility condition expressed more shame-relevant 
emotions and behaviors than did children in the ambiguous responsibility condition. 
Results of the guilt and shame classification received only partial support, as 
children were dichotomized according to avoidant behaviors. Results suggest that the 
avoidance reflects shame-prone responding in children, as shame is conceptualized as 
avoidant behavior and affective discomfort. Nonavoiders may not fully reflect guilt, as 
the groups were dichotomized by avoidance but not by reparations. Results suggest that 
nonavoiders may reflect at least a child's proneness to guilt, as nonavoiders were higher 
than avoiders in guilt-relevant reactions such as latency to repair. Additionally, the 
avoidanthonavoidant classification was related to age. However, responsibility 
manipulations did not relate to the avoidant classification as expected. Individual 
differences were associated with the nonavoidantlavoidant classification, reflecting guilt 
and shame-prone responding. Nonavoiders, in comparison with avoiders, were rated by 
teachers as more socially competent, and by parents as higher in affective discomfort after 
wrongdoing. These findings may suggest that shame developmentally precedes guilt, but 
that these emotions also reflect important individual differences in social and emotional 
functioning . 
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Early investigations of self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, and 
embarrassment relied primarily on theoretical explanations of their importance and 
potential harm to the human psyche. Most notable among these early theories is Freud's 
(1 925Il974) notion that guilt emerges from the development of the superego. Beyond his 
early explorations of guilt, self-conscious emotions have received little theoretical or 
empirical investigation. Research in the development of emotions and emotional 
expressions in children has consistently emphasized the emergence of increasingly 
complex skills and understanding. Intensive research efforts have been aimed at the 
"basic emotions" such as anger and joy. Until recently, few researchers have investigated 
the self-conscious emotions, and therefore less is known about their developmental 
course or correlates. Our understanding of emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, envy, 
and embarrassment comes more from folk wisdom than from research. Although it was 
once thought that any study of emotion was inherently problematic and therefore best left 
to the world of literature and poetry, the self-conscious emotions have only recently 
emerged from this stigma (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Tangney, 1995, 1998). The 
discrepancy between our knowledge of the basic and self-conscious emotions may come 
in part from our ability to study and isolate these affective states. Basic emotions, such as 
joy, are particularly easy to identify and record. But how do we identify and isolate an 
expression of guilt? Researchers have been grappling with the issue of measurement ever 
since Freud's early theory. 
Formerly, these emotions were operationalized in such a way that it was difficult 
to distinguish guilt from other emotions, particularly shame. More recent theories 
emphasize the need to differentiate guilt from shame; with the former requiring an 
assessment of the action as being a violation whereas the latter requires that the self be 
viewed as faulty (e.g., Sroufe, 1995; Tangney, 1998; Weiner, 1986). With these more 
easily operationalized theoretical constructs, researchers have become less reluctant to 
investigate these emotions. Still, plotting the developmental course and consequences of 
guilt allows for a richer understanding of the emotional lives of children. 
Significance of Studying Guilt 
In examining the emergence of guilt and its differentiation from shame, we are 
assuming that these emotions have some degree of impact on a child's current or future 
functioning. Little is known about the importance of these emotions, however, because 
they are so difficult to study (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998). Although there are many 
theoretical explanations of how guilt and shame differ, and of their differential correlates, 
we are unable to say when these emotions become distinct, which children are more 
prone to experience one emotion rather than the other, or how these emotions affect a 
child's social and emotional functioning. 
Definitions of Self-Conscious Emotions and Guilt 
To investigate the emergence of these self-conscious emotions, it is first useful to 
understand how they are distinct from the more basic emotions. Basic emotions are 
defined as emotions that emerge early in life and require few cognitive abilities, are 
experienced in all cultures, are easily recognizable, and have a clear biological component 
such as the production of distinct facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard & 
Malatesta, 1989). In contrast, self-conscious emotions emerge later in life and require 
increased cognitive capacities. This class of emotions is produced when the self is 
compared to some standard or when the self is viewed from another person's perspective 
(Lewis, 1993; Stipek, 1995). For example, guilt requires that children be aware that they 
exist as a separate entity such that they have their own actions and intentions. In addition, 
children must be able to compare their behavior to an internal standard (e.g., Lewis, 1993; 
Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). As such, guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment, 
envy, and empathy require the ability to be conscious or aware of the self in the social 
context, and to be aware of how others may view their thoughts or behaviors. 
Early theoretical investigations of guilt were made within a psychoanalytic 
framework, and largely ignored its distinction from shame. For example, Freud argued 
that guilt was a reaction to conflicts between the ego and the superego, but made no real 
mention of shame. Later neo-Freudian theorists did differentiate these two emotions by 
retaining the original definition of guilt but added that shame was a reaction to conflict 
between the ego and the ego-ideal. Although the superego can be thought of as 
conscience, the ego-ideal is characterized as a perfection of the self. As Tangney (1998) 
points out, this distinction has similarities with other theories of the time and even 
contemporary definitions. For example, H. B. Lewis (1971) distinguished shame and guilt 
according to self and behavior focuses. 
The primary definitional distinction made by most present day theorists has 
retained a striking similarity to early neo-Freudian ones. Shame focuses on the failure of 
the self whereas guilt focuses on the behavior or failed action. When the action is viewed 
as separate from the self, the emotional reaction is not as global or devastating. When the 
self is viewed as the failure, the resulting emotional experience may be felt more 
intensely and chronically since it is a more global internal assault. From these emotions 
come distinct behavioral responses. With shame, it is the self that is bad, rather than the 
action, causing the child to hide or shrink away and not want to admit the wrongful act. 
Guilt, which comes from a realization that the action rather than the self is bad, requires 
the child to repair, make amends, and admit the act. Guilt then gives rise to responsibility 
and fault, whereas shame brings about embarrassment and humiliation (e.g., H. B. Lewis, 
197 1). 
The above definition of guilt would require a certain degree of cognitive 
advancement, or superego development, to be truly experienced. With increasing 
cognitive abilities, such as seeing the self as a separate agent, children acquire two 
important aspects in the development of self-conscious emotions. First, they are able to 
evaluate themselves against a standard or rule and second, they are able to judge their 
personal responsibility for the action (Lewis, 199 1 ; Saarni, Murnme, & Campos, 1998). 
The cognitive egocentrism of young children may mean that they should see all actions as 
their fault, and should not be able to distinguish between instances of personal 
responsibility and external causes of failure. However, findings in support of this are 
equivocal. Studies of children's understanding of the role of personal responsibility 
suggest that it is not until middle childhood that this appreciation develops (e.g., Shorr & 
McClelland, 1998; Weiner & Graham, 1989; Williams & Bybee, 1994) but observational 
studies of preschoolers and toddlers show at least rudimentary displays of self-conscious 
emotions (e.g., Kochanska, 1999; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997; Lewis, Alessandri, 
& Sullivan, 1992). 
Other theorists have moved away from the self-behavior distinction and have 
instead tried to differentiate these emotions in terms of their functional significance. In 
defining emotions from a functionalist perspective, guilt is experienced when the goal of 
meeting internalized standards is not reached and shame results when the child fails to 
reach the goal of having the respect of others and of preserving self-esteem (Barrett & 
Campos, 1987). According to functionalist theory, the adaptive function of shame is not 
only to act in a socially acceptable way, but also to show submission to others. In 
contrast, guilt functions to encourage prosocial behavior and communicates remorse. 
In order to more fully understand the distinctions made by these theories, the 
remainder of the chapter reviews the major theoretical orientations used to conceptualize 
guilt and its development. In addition, current research examining the developn~ent of 
guilt and its differentiation from the more global emotion of shame will be critically 
reviewed. Studies of the development of guilt (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991) 
generally conclude that children are not capable of understanding situational differences 
that lead to feelings of personal responsibility until they are eight years old. As Cole, 
Barrett, and Zahn-Waxler (1992) found, even toddlers are capable of displaying guilt-like 
emotions. As will be seen, the difference in these estimations of children's self-conscious 
emotional experiences appears to lie in the methods used to assess them. As such, in 
attempting to understand the development of guilt, empirical evidence will reflect these 
methodological differences. The initial sections discuss the predominant theories that 
have begun to distinguish shame from guilt, and continue with a summary and critique of 
the current research findings from a methodological perspective, followed by a discussion 
of the specific research questions and hypotheses that theory and research have generated. 
Major Theories 
Several theorists have attempted to explain the development and importance of 
guilt by trying to obtain a clear idea of the role of guilt in development. One widely 
debated aspect of guilt concerns the point in development that children are first capable of 
experiencing or displaying this emotion. In order to determine the emergence of guilt, it is 
first necessary to conceptualize and define guilt as distinct from shame. The distinction 
between shame and guilt is not as clear as may be thought, and research that examines 
guilt sometimes actually relates to shame. Clearly, the answer to the development of guilt 
relies, in part, on how guilt is defined. 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives 
Some of the earliest investigations of shame and guilt have come from 
psychoanalytic theorists who have attempted to understand the development and impact 
of this class of emotions. In Sigmund Freud's (192511974) writings, children were 
described as developing the superego through identification with the same-sex parent. As 
such, the child internalized the rules of society so that the superego acted as one's 
conscience. Guilt was thought to be the product of a struggle between the ego and the 
superego as manifested by the Oedipal conflict. Since the formation of the superego is 
based on a fear of losing parental love, guilt was not clearly differentiated from shame. In 
addition, the superego was not thought to develop until a child was about 6 years old and 
continued to strengthen into middle elementary years. Toddlers and young preschool 
children would then be incapable of experiencing guilt. According to this view, it is 
clearly not until the resolution of the Oedipal conflict and the identification with the 
same-sex parent that this emotion can be felt (see Tangney, 1995 for a review). 
As Lazarus (1991) states, guilt and shame may be difficult to distinguish in 
psychoanalytic terms since both are under the rubric of the superego. H. B. Lewis (1971) 
provides the clearest thinking about these emotions, as she blended psychoanalytic theory 
with a more cognitive approach. In this conceptualization, guilt emerges from a focus on 
the wrongful action, whereas shame is the product of a realization of a failed self. As 
such, shame reflects a global negative evaluation of the self. Shame then creates the 
experience of exposure and a need to avoid the critical eye of others (real or imagined). In 
contrast, guilt is not directed at the self, but rather a particular action. Therefore, guilt 
produces a need to repair the misdeed in action or by brooding over how something 
should have been done differently. Goldberg (1999) notes that shame and guilt have long 
been confused in psychoanalytic writings, and that shame in contrast to guilt reflects "the 
discrepancy between the person we seek to be and who we experience ourselves to be at 
that moment" (p. 257). 
Due to the ambiguities of Freudian theory in defining guilt, specific hypotheses 
are difficult to generate, and especially difficult to test. One testable hypothesis is that 
children should not be able to experience guilt until about the age of 6, but this does not 
necessarily point to the development of the superego as the ultimate cause. In addition, 
many of the behavioral characteristics of guilt are post hoc in that the clinical presentation 
of various symptoms such as hostility could be interpreted as a conflict between the ego 
and superego. The model of guilt presented by H. B. Lewis (1 97 1) does allow for 
empirical validation though. Guilt can be observed in children through their reparative 
actions, but also in ruminations about how things could have been done differently. 
Shame would involve the need to avoid the caregiver or protect the caregiver-child 
relationship. The hypotheses generated by these theories lack precision and testability, 
but they do have considerable heuristic value and have been the basis for more modern 
theories. 
Cognitive and Developmental Theories 
With the cognitive revolution in psychology, the importance of children's 
thoughts became central to many aspects of development, including emotion. A variety of 
cognitive capabilities have been proposed as prerequisites to the emergence of the 
capacity for guilt, with most placing some importance on the notion that a child needs to 
understand that his or her action was wrong. In addition, these theories view cognitions 
as developing slowly, so that precursors to guilt should be apparent before full-fledged 
guilt is possible. 
Hoffman's Theory. 
Similar to H. B. Lewis's notion that guilt arises fiom concern over one's actions, 
Hoffman (1984) argues that guilt arises from the understanding that one has control over 
one's actions, which develops in the preschool years, and fiom an understanding of 
causality, which emerges early in development. Central to this is the notion that children 
gradually come to understand the distinction of the self and other, and therefore can be 
responsible for their actions. It is this understanding of responsibility that allows for the 
emergence of guilt and empathy. 
Hoffnlan though does not argue that guilt emerges fiom nothing to something. 
Instead he posits that early precursors to guilt are seen even in infancy, as babies respond 
to another person's pain. Still, it is not until the self and other are clearly delineated that 
children can experience responsibility and, therefore, full-fledged guilt. In a final stage 
of guilt development, Hoffman argues that children feel guilt not just from the notion that 
they are responsible for another person's distress, but that they can feel guilty when they 
observe another person's distress but do nothing to help. Guilt can arise from empathy, 
because one feels guilty about another person's distress. Guilt then can take the form of 
feelings of responsibility for one's action and inaction. 
The primary hypothesis that is evident from Hoffman's theory is that there should 
be a developmental progression from empathy to guilt as a sense of responsibility 
increases. In particular, feeling guilty about one's inaction reflects empathic concern for 
the other so a child expressing guilt would have to be capable of performing other 
empathy tasks. The distinction between precursors and guilt may lie in the situations that 
elicit them, with the latter capable only in situations where the child has responsibility for 
the harm caused to the other person. 
Attributional Theories. 
Guilt and shame can also be differentiated according to the attributions that are 
made about any given outcome. Weiner (1 986) argues that both shame and guilt result 
from intense negative reactions to failure, but that the difference lies in the attributions 
that are made. Shame results from failures that are directed at the self, and are perceived 
to be uncontrollable. Guilt is a reaction to failure that is perceived to be controllable. In 
addition, these emotions differ on several other dimensions. Shame requires an audience, 
so the punishment is thought to be external. When a failure is thought to be due to 
uncontrollable factors, such as lack of ability, the emotion experienced by others should 
be pity. In contrast, guilt does not require an audience, so the punishment is internal, and 
will result in anger from others. For example, some children may experience guilt about 
not having studied sufficiently for an exam, whereas other children may experience 
shame because they feel that they are not smart enough to do well on the exam. These 
distinctions come from the child's own attributions about the source of the failure, 
whether controllable, such as effort, or uncontrollable, such as ability. These attributions 
result in stable action tendencies, with guilt creating a desire to repair and shame creating 
helplessness and withdrawal. 
With these definitional distinctions in mind, Weiner and Graham (1 989) propose 
that the development of these emotions follows a two-stage model. First, children 
respond to situations emotionally by appraising the outcome of the event. The emotional 
response that follows will be globally positive or negative. No attributions are made at 
this stage, and only the valence of the outcome is considered. In the second 
developmental stage of the model, children's cognitive appraisal of a situation includes 
attributions of responsibility. For example, children may experience pride at having 
completed a task when they have made the attribution that they, rather than another 
person, was responsible for the task success. When a failure occurs, children then 
consider whether it was controllable or uncontrollable. This second stage requires 
advanced cognitive abilities, and therefore guilt and shame would not be expected in 
young children. 
Continuing with the importance of attributions, Lewis (1 991) has proposed a 
model of how guilt and shame develop. Lewis (1 99 1, 1993) argues for what he calls a 
cognitive attributional theory of self-conscious emotions. Lewis argues that self- 
conscious emotions develop from three cognitive components: standards, rules and goals; 
evaluation; and attribution of the self. This first component, the standards, rules and 
goals that direct our behaviors, are socialized and internalized in early development. The 
second and third components of his model are similar to Weiner's, with an evaluation of 
personal success or failure, and subsequent attributions being necessary. These 
cognitions produce the experience of shame or guilt. Like Weiner, Lewis argues that the 
experience of shame or guilt depends on the third component of the model, or 
attributions, with shame being more global and guilt more specific. 
Lewis (1 991) argues that guilt and shame both emerge after several cognitive 
prerequisites are met. First, a child must develop objective self-awareness, often 
empirically described as self-recognition. This first step typically emerges by the middle 
of the second year of life. Next, children develop a set of standards, rules, and goals. For 
example, by the end of the first year of life, infants are beginning to learn the rules that 
govern society, and by the end of the second year have a rudimentary understanding of 
good and bad actions. Finally, children must be able to infer that they are responsible for 
their actions, a concept reflected in the need to separate the self and object. 
According to this attributional theory, guilt and shame are not possible in children 
until about 3 years old, and should develop at the same time since they require similar 
cognitive skills. Following this model, several hypotheses are evident. First, children 
younger than 3 years old should not be capable of exhibiting either shame or guilt 
whereas children over 3 years old should exhibit both. In addition, the ability to 
comprehend the significance of violating rules and standards should correlate highly with 
the expression of guilt and shame. This primarily cognitive theory states that shame and 
guilt have a parallel developmental course, with both emerging fiom the internalization of 
rules. 
Functionalist Theory. 
One of the key theorists writing from a functionalist perspective, Lazarus (1991) 
terms his theory cognitive-motivational-relational. The key element to this theory is that 
the particular emotion that is expressed and felt comes from a unique relational meaning. 
The relationship, such as the caregiver-child relationship, and the harms and benefits of 
an emotion, are formed from two types of appraisals. The primary appraisal examines the 
goal relevance and congruity, whereas the secondary appraisal consists of "blame or 
credit, coping potential, and future expectations" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 39). As each emotion 
has a particular relational meaning, each also has a unique pattern of primary and 
secondary appraisals associated with it. In the case of guilt, the core relational theme 
involves a moral transgression. Moral transgressions may or may not involve the 
presence of another person, and may or may not have actually occurred. The key is that 
the person feels that a moral imperative has been violated. 
Lazarus concedes that the origins of guilt within his theory have considerable 
overlap with the psychoanalytic tradition, attributional theory, and Hoffman's theory 
since they all see guilt as rooted in the core relational theme of violating a moral 
imperative. His conception of shame has considerable overlap in language with the 
psychoanalytic tradition, as shame is conceptualized as a failure to live up to an ego ideal. 
Since the ego ideal originates from the parent, a failure in front of a parent or similar 
parental figure is an attack on the self and the internalized parent. Children who 
experience shame feel that they are receiving criticism from an important other, so the 
misdeed is a threat to the relationship. It is a fear of losing the love of the parent, or a fear 
of abandonment, that drives shame. As with guilt though, the critical other does not need 
to be present for shame to be experienced. So although guilt is based on a moral 
transgression and shame on an internalized ideal, neither requires the presence of others. 
Lazarus points out that all emotions are reactions to some social context, whether real or 
imagined. The hnction of emotions as defined by Lazarus reflects an adaptation of the 
individual and a response to our needs and actions as they are experienced in our social 
environment. Emotions are then a complex combination of several aspects, including 
cognitions and motivations. 
According to Lazarus' framework, these emotions are also experienced as a result 
of primary and secondary appraisals. For guilt to be experienced, the primary appraisal 
would be that there is a moral transgression. This can result in anger, anxiety, guilt, or 
disgust. Only if the secondary appraisal involves self-blame for the transgression will 
there be guilt. Finally, a child with good coping skills will attempt to make reparations. 
In contrast to theorists who discuss only the positive outcomes of guilt, Lazarus argues 
that there can be negative ones if the person denies responsibility, projects it elsewhere, or 
avoids thinking about the victim. Even though there is no self-blame involved, Lazarus 
proposes that the person may still experience guilt. 
For shame to be experienced, the primary appraisal involves a failure to reach an 
ego ideal, which again can result in ang&, anxiety, shame, and disgust. If the secondary 
appraisal involves blame to the self, then shame rather than guilt will be experienced. In 
contrast with other theorists, Lazarus notes that there can be positive outcomes to shame. 
Children with adequate coping skills, according to their own appraisal, will simply work 
hqder to live up to the ideal. In addition, if the hture outcomes are thought to be 
favorable, the fear of abandonment, and therefore shame, will be reduced. Most theorists 
argue that since shame reflects a fear of abandonment or loss of parental love, people who 
experience shame are overly concerned with this issue. In contrast, Lazarus contends that 
shame should not be conceptualized in terms of these motivations, but in terms of the 
relational issue and appraisals. 
Barrett (1998) also argues for the role of cognition in the emergence of self- 
conscious emotions. Differing from others, though, she contends that emotions are only 
influenced by cognition, but cannot be defined by it. Instead, emotions are defined by 
their function in the environment. Barrett asserts that the cognitive prerequisites often 
seen to be important to the development of guilt are present even in infants. These 
prerequisites include self-recognition and a "rudimentary awareness of what they are 
doing" (p. 78). She contends that although mirror recognition does not develop until 15 
to 24 months, infants display these cognitive prerequisites in their empathetic crying and 
in their ability to learn sucking patterns in response to their mother's voice (e.g., 
DeCasper & Fifer, 1980). Although these prerequisites are present in infants, they are 
unlikely to experience guilt since they are unable to appreciate that they have deviated 
from a standard. It is only through socialization that a child has a cognitive understanding 
of rules and standards. Although she asserts that standards must be examined, she does 
not see them as ultimately important in understanding when guilt can emerge. In contrast, 
she argues that it is not the emergence of cognitive skills that is important, nor the 
emergence of full-fledged guilt, but the unfolding of increasingly more contexts in which 
guilt can be experienced. It is only from experience and socialization that guilt can be 
experienced in a particular context. The distinction between socialization, which is 
thought to be an important factor in the widening contexts of these emotions, and 
internalization of rules and standards is not clear, however. 
The action tendencies of guilt and shame as described by Barrett coincide with 
other theorists, and are viewed in relation to their expressive function. Guilt 
communicates a desire to repair the action done and repair the relationship. Barrett 
asserts that there are children who rely more on shame-relevant responses whereas others 
display guilt-relevant behaviors. It is not the cognitions that are the focus, but the 
contexts. Developmentally, children simply show guilt-like reactions in a wider variety 
of contexts (Barrett, 1998). Although as Barrett points out, there are some rudimentary 
cognitive capabilities present in infants, few would argue that these nascent abilities are 
likely to produce complex cognitions. Even if an infant has the ability to move a toe to 
cause a mobile to move, we cannot say that the infant could then experience guilt or 
shame when the string is broken. This hnctionalist perspective does raise an interesting 
point, though. Although it is argued here that there are certain cognitive precursors 
necessary to the experience of guilt, the idea that children will learn to feel guilty across a 
wider variety of situations seems very likely. For example, a preschooler may have little 
emotional reaction to not inviting a friend to a birthday party, but an adolescent might feel 
guilty in a similar situation. The increase in the contexts in which guilt is expressed 
should not however mean that cognitions are unimportant. There may be a point at which 
guilt is experienced in a full form, in contrast to toddler experiences of guilt where it may 
continue to be refined through development. In addition, Stegge and colleagues note that 
guilt may be elicited in situations where one has harmed another, whereas shame may be 
elicited in situations where one has not exhibited enough control over one's behavior so 
that they are acting in a way inconsistent with their beliefs (Olthof, Schouten, Kuiper, 
Stegge, & Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000). 
Sroufe's Theory. 
In contrast to Barrett's view of cognition in self-conscious emotions, Sroufe 
(1 995) contends that cognition, social development, and emotional development are 
inseparable. For example, it is only with the emergence of the autonomous self that 
negative evaluation is possible, with shame emerging before guilt. There must be a 
separateness of self and others, and an understanding that people have different 
intentions. The precursors apparent in toddlers come to fruition in preschoolers, who are 
more directed by internal behavioral control. Whereas toddlers require adult presence to 
follow rules, preschoolers are increasingly able to regulate their actions (Kopp, 1982; 
Maccoby, 1984). Sroufe argues that it is the somewhat undifferentiated self that causes 
the global reaction of sha l e  in toddlers. Shame results from only a basic sense of right 
and wrong, and is therefore a global emotional reaction. In contrast, guilt is a more 
specific reaction at having done something wrong. Therefore, although guilt is not 
possible until the preschool period, it emerges from earlier prototypes, such as shame. 
Guilt is differentiated from shame since it requires a more separate self and "often entails 
an exact appreciation of what one has done" (Sroufe, 1995, p. 198). In addition, it is no 
longer a reaction to external standards and therefore can be experienced without an 
audience. 
Emotional development as defined by Sroufe is based on the assumption that the 
child generates the context. With shame and guilt, the context as defined by the child will 
create the emotional reaction. In the case of guilt, it is the context that is scrutinized 
because the actions were wrong, and this reaction is therefore more specific to that 
context. This evaluation makes reparation possible. Shame, acting to attack the self, is 
more like global anxiety or global ill feeling. Reparation of the relationship rather than 
the actions is of primary concern. Shame is therefore not context specific. This is similar 
to Weiner and Graham's (1989) theory of self-conscious emotions since both anticipate 
more global emotional reactions to be precursors to later context specific ones. 
Several hypotheses are apparent from Sroufe's model. First, guilt should be more 
apparent in older preschoolers and should be more context specific. Younger 
preschoolers should then react with more shame regardless of context. These reactions 
should be visible in their specific reparation attempts with shame causing more behaviors 
aimed at repairing the self or the relationship with a harmed other, whereas a child feeling 
guilt should be more likely to actively try to repair, for example, a broken object. 
Summary of Major Theories 
With the exception of psychoanalytic theories, the theories presented above share 
several common elements. First, the behavioral distinction between guilt and shame is 
clearly one of action or withdrawal. Guilt is noted to be an emotion that motivates one to 
repair the damage that has been done. Shame motivates the person to avoid both the 
situation and the harmed other due to the fear of losing the love of the parent. These 
behavioral traits are proposed in psychoanalytic theories as well, with the addition of 
avoidance and projection as reactions to guilt. Second, the focus of blame clearly 
distinguishes shame from guilt. For guilt to be manifested, the focus is placed on the 
action, rather than the self, which is seen with shame. This relationship between the self 
and shame is common across all theories, with psychoanalytic traditions simply 
discussing the self in terms of the ego-ideal. Underlying these behavioral traits, though, 
the theories presented above differ in the proposed genesis.of these self-conscious 
emotions. 
The factor that most clearly discriminates these theories is the relative emphasis 
placed on cognitive, social, or intrapsychic factors as keys to the emergence of guilt. 
With each particular emphasis there also comes a hypothesized age at which guilt can be 
first experienced. For example, psychoanalytic theories view the development of the 
superego, and its reactions to unacceptable aggressive and sexual impulses, as the driving 
factor in the development of guilt. Since the superego is of primary importance, guilt is 
not possible until children are about six years old. Similarly, functionalist theories view 
shame as a reaction to the ego-ideal, but these theorists do not see the underlying 
motivation for guilt or shame to be of primary importance. In contrast, attributional 
theories, with the emphasis on cognitive development, generally propose that shame and 
guilt are parallel constructs, requiring the same abilities. Accordingly, shame and guilt 
should emerge at the same age, which is hypothesized to be when children are about 3 
years old. 
Although all of the theories presented propose that guilt cannot emerge from 
nothing to something, Sroufe argues that the differentiated self, and the consequent self- 
controlled behavior, is the key developmental feature that makes guilt possible. In 
contrast, shame, which involves both a global reaction and basic sense of right and 
wrong, is a rudimentary precursor to guilt. With Sroufe's emphasis on self-regulation, 
guilt is hypothesized to emerge from shame in the preschool years. Whether the origins 
of shame and guilt as proposed by these theorists can be empirically validated remains to 
be seen, but the assumption of these theories that the central issue of guilt is one of 
personal responsibility, should be examined, along with the developmental progression of 
the experience of guilt. 
Empirical Evidence in Young Children 
Since the predominant theories of self-conscious emotions focus on cognitive 
development, researchers have primarily investigated the emerging understanding of guilt 
and shame in older children. School-aged children increasingly differentiate shame from 
guilt, are more aware of the role of personal responsibility in these self-conscious 
emotions, and feel guilt or shame in different contexts. Early developmental expressions 
of self-conscious emotions have only recently been investigated. The theories presented 
above differ in whether guilt is possible in early childhood or not, and can develop with 
or without shame. As with most fields, the answers found reflect the theory underlying 
the investigation, and therefore the methods used. For example, theories that rely heavily 
on cognition require a verbal understanding of guilt, whereas relational theories may 
investigate expressive components of guilt. As such, the following literature review will 
examine the findings in terms of the methodology used. As will be seen, the evidence of 
school-aged children's increasing emotion understanding comes from interviews, whereas 
the growing body of research pointing to early development of self-conscious emotions in 
toddlers and preschoolers is evidenced by their emotional expressions in behavioral tests. 
Hvpothetical Situations 
Research examining the development of guilt and shame has primarily focused on 
its emergence in elementary school-aged children. The focus on this age group is driven 
in part by research suggesting that guilt and shame are not distinct until about 8 years of 
age. These findings may partially result from the cognitive emphasis of the theory, as 
well as the methodology used. In particular, these studies find that children's 
understanding of guilt and shame does not emerge until children are able to adhere to 
moral standards whether or not they are in the presence of an authority figure (e.g., 
Damon, 1988; Kagan, 1984). Using attributions of responsibility to define guilt and 
shame, research suggests that children may not be capable of experiencing these emotions 
until even later in childhood. The key methodology used to explore the cognitive 
components of guilt and shame is through hypothetical stories. Typically, children are 
presented with a story and asked to rate the degree of controllability and the emotion that 
would likely be felt. 
Results of research involving story characters do support cognitive-attributional 
theories of guilt. In a series of studies examining the role of emotion understanding in the 
development of self-conscious emotions, Weiner and colleagues have found that 
children's use of attributions of responsibility does change with age (e.g. Weiner, 1985; 
Weiner & Graham, 1989; Weiner, Graham, Stem, & Lawson, 1982). In one study, 10- 
year-old children more reliably linked intentionality of story characters with emotion and 
intensity, with guilt less often reported and being of lower intensity for uncontrollable 
situations than for younger children (Weiner & Graham, 1989). In an additional study 
investigating the use of affective cues to determine responsibility, children were read 
hypothetical situations in which a child failed a test, and were then told the emotional 
reaction (anger or pity) of the teacher. When asked to rate the degree that the failure was 
due to low ability or poor effort, 5-year-old children did not reliably understand that a 
teacher's angry reaction was due to low effort rather than low ability. The results were 
especially apparent when the teacher reportedly felt pity for the child. Only the oldest age 
group, 9-year-old children, reported that the teacher's reaction was due to the child's lack 
of ability (Weiner et al., 1982). These findings suggest that children in early elementary 
school are only just beginning to use affective cues of others to help in their causal 
attributions, and that pity is linked to a lack of responsibility, and anger to responsibility. 
Finally, Thompson (1989) studied the use of emotions to describe story characters by 
children in second grade, fifth grade, and by college students. Although children in 
second grade used global emotions such as happy and sad to describe characters, they also 
reported that the characters might feel pride or guilt in response to certain situations. 
These findings suggest that younger children still rely on global outcome-based 
assessments, but are beginning to use attributions of responsibility to predict emotional 
reactions (Thompson, 1989). 
Seeing an event as controllable or uncontrollable has implications for possible 
intemal causes as well. Stipek and DeCostis (1988) found that intemal causes such as 
low ability, which is uncontrollable, and low effort, which is controllable, were all seen as 
controllable by children under 10 years old. In addition, 9- to 13-year-old children, but 
not 6- to 7-year-old children, saw failures due to low ability as capable of eliciting both 
shame and guilt. If children understood the role of personal responsibility in failure, they 
should view failures due to low ability as uncontrollable. Failures due to lack of effort are 
controllable though, and should elicit guilt. Hypothetical failures due to low effort mostly 
elicited guilt for this older group, suggesting that older children understand that guilt 
results from controllable events. 
Barrett's (1998) theory, which states that self-conscious emotions develop in 
relation to context, has gained partial support from a series of investigations that find the 
types of events that children think will elicit shame versus guilt changes with age. For 
example, Ferguson and colleagues (1 991) found that although children reported more 
guilt to hypothetical situations involving moral transgressions than social blunders, they 
reported equal levels of shame to these situations. When asked why they felt these 
emotions, children reported feeling guilt principally because they had violated a norm, 
especially if the act was done purposely. This guilt was accompanied by a desire to make 
reparations. Children understood shame to be a result of the fear of the audience's 
reaction, and therefore resulted in a desire to avoid others. In addition, when comparing 
second and fifth graders, older children were better at sorting situations involving shame 
from guilt. Older more than younger children reported that guilt was associated with a 
desire to confess, and shame was associated with an attack on their self-concept. Finally, 
younger children more often reported that both shame and guilt would result from a fear 
of possible punishment and reactions from others. These findings also lend support to 
theories that controllability will elicit different emotions, and that these emotions will 
result in different action tendencies. In addition, although younger children rely on the 
reaction of the audience for shame and guilt, these data are only designed to tap into 
children's understanding of the distinction between shame and guilt, not their actual 
behaviors. 
One study of preschoolers' responses to hypothetical situations suggests that even 
young children assess the context in whlch failures occur (Cain & Staneck, 1999). When 
faced with criticism, children who had rated their hypothetical work as good reported 
more negative affect, had lower global self-qualities, and reported that they were less 
likely to persist at the task than those who rated their performance as poor. These children 
did not differ, however, on the actual presentation of shame-like behaviors when being 
told the hypothetical story. Although this may simply be a reflection of the lack of power 
of a hypothetical situation to cause actual felt shame, 4- but not 5-year-old children who 
displayed higher levels of shame did perform more poorly on a false-belief task. In 
addition, both 4- and 5-year-old children high in shame performed more poorly on an 
emotional perspective-taking task. These findings, although tentative due to the 
somewhat weak effects, do suggest that preschool children prone to shame are less able to 
identify the emotions of others, and are less likely to be able to take another's perspective. 
Interviews 
One of the drawbacks of using story characters is that the situations may not 
reflect experiences that the child has had. One solution to this problem is to use free- 
recall or open-ended interviewing. This methodology calls for children to respond to a 
semi-structured interview format that elicits memories of past emotional experiences. 
Using free recall of emotions suggests an earlier understanding of the distinction between 
guilt and shame than do responses to story characters. When children aged 6 to 11 were 
asked to recall a situation in which they felt a particular emotion (e.g., guilt, anger, pity), 
and whether the situation was controllable, even the youngest children reported that pity 
resulted from uncontrollable conditions, and anger from controllable ones (Graham, 
Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984). For the youngest age group, guilt was reported for 
uncontrollable situations, whereas the oldest age group reported guilt for controllable 
conditions. Younger children may not be aware of the importance of personal 
responsibility in the experience of guilt, but this does not mean that children do not react 
differentially to situations with and without personal responsibility. The results simply 
suggest that children do not verbally understand these distinctions; their emotional 
reactions might tell us otherwise. 
Projective measures such as the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Study (1 978) 
have been used to tap the development of guilt. Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
have found that young children report more guilt regardless of whether their actions were 
controllable or uncontrollable than do older children. For example, although 6-year-old 
children engaged in more self-blame and apology, by age 1 1, children reported that they 
would engage in more behavior aimed at amending the action that was in their control 
(Graybill, 1990). In a longitudinal study of children at first, second, and third grades 
tested again 5 years later, similar results were found (Graybill, 1993). In addition, even 
with the increased knowledge of the role of personal responsibility in feelings of guilt, 
older children were not more likely to try to evade responsibility by blaming external 
circumstances. This suggests that even as children develop an understanding that some 
uncontrollable factors may effect the perception of responsibility, children were not more 
likely to try to excuse behavior by blaming these external causes. Although these studies 
report that these emotional reactions develop over time, the major focus is one of 
understanding and cognition rather than emotion. Although 6-year-old children were not 
found to distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable events, it remains unclear if 
this is due to a deficit in their understanding or in their actual emotional responses. 
In a study of children in middle childhood and adolescents' descriptions of 
situations that made them feel guilty, several guilt elicitors changed over time. Older 
children were less likely to report feeling guilty in situations in which they had no control 
(Williams & Bybee, 1994). In addition, older children were more likely to mention 
feeling guilty over inaction. Shorr and McClelland (1998) found that by 8 years old, 
children classify lack of helping as a cause of guilt. These studies suggest that older 
elementary school children have a more adult-like understanding of shame and guilt than 
younger children, and that the classification of guilt and shame continue to develop into 
adolescence. For example, adolescents are more likely to report guilt over internal 
thoughts and feelings such as being inconsiderate, rather than external acts, particularly 
externalizing behaviors (Williams & Bybee, 1994). 
Finally, an examination of the antecedents and consequences of guilt and shame 
suggests that children's understanding of these emotions may not be reflected in one or 
two questions. Although 5- and 6-year-olds frequently said that they did not know how to 
define guilt, they described different antecedents to the emotion. For example, events in 
which they were aggressive or broke the rules were often cited as antecedents to guilt, 
whereas exposure and evaluation failure, such as failure at a school task or being attacked 
by peers, was cited as a cause for shame (Berti, Garattoni, & Venturini, 2000). It should 
be noted that peer evaluation such as an attack or rebuff was also cited as antecedents to 
sadness, but the authors note that the behavioral reactions to these emotions differed. For 
example, with shame they mentioned a desire to hide or remove themselves from the 
situation, which was not mentioned in regard to sadness. As such, it is likely that young 
children do have different reactions, or action tendencies in relation to these emotions, 
but do not understand the emotions themselves. 
Since these studies rely on children's reports of emotional experiences, whether 
with story characters or free recall, several methodological issues should be reviewed to 
interpret these results. First, the focus of these studies has been on children's 
understanding of attributions of responsibility and causal antecedents, not actual 
behaviors. Although the authors do not try to overstate their case by arguing that 
emotions such as guilt are not possible at earlier ages, it should be remembered that 
emotion understanding often develops after emotion production, especially for the basic 
emotions (e.g., Ackerrnan, Abe, & Izard, 1998; Denham, 1998). Second, these studies 
rely heavily on the use of language. When young children report that they experience 
guilt from an uncontrollable event, it may not be because guilt is an undifferentiated 
reaction, but that children do not understand the semantic difference between shame and 
guilt. 
Parental Report 
The emergence of guilt has been relatively ignored in preschoolers and toddlers 
since both hypothetical vignettes and interviews are difficult to use with these age groups. 
Self-conscious emotions, including guilt and shame, have been investigated with parental 
report for younger children. Kochanska has studied the emergence of conscience in 
toddlers and preschoolers, with affective and behavioral responses to mishaps being 
influenced by both maternal socialization and temperament (Kochanska, 1993, 1999; 
Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putnam, 1994). In developing a parent measure 
of conscience in children, Kochanska and colleagues propose that conscience can be 
classified into two orthogonal domains. The first, affective discomfort, has been defined 
as guilt, arousal, and remorse associated with actual and perceived wrongdoing. Second, 
behavioral control is defined as the ability to refrain from wrongdoing and control 
impulses. This measure which has demonstrated adequate reliability (alphas ranging from 
.59 to .93) has been used to assess developmental trends in young children's conscience 
development. Kochanska and colleagues found that 3-year-old children had significantly 
greater reported discomfort after wrongdoing, were more apologetic, more compliant to 
rules even without adult supervision, and were more concerned over the misbehavior of 
others than were 2-year-old children. However, 3-year-old children did not differ from 4 
to 5-year-old children. 
Between the two factors proposed, affective discomfort was found to increase 
with age, was higher in girls than in boys, and was related to several temperament indices 
for girls. Kochanska argues that these data suggest that 3 years of age may be a time 
when a major developmental transition occurs, and may be visible as a precursor in 2- 
year-old children. Although affective discomfort reflects the emotional responses of 
preschoolers, it is difficult to determine whether developmental changes in this factor are 
attributable to changes in shame or in guilt, as both emotions are assessed in this 
dimension. For example, distress and guilt are assessed along with questions concerning 
the child's focus on the parent-child bond rather than the damage to the object. This 
second scale seems more reflective of shame responses than guilt, making the 
development of these distinct affective reactions unclear from these data. 
The second factor, active moral regulatiodvigilance, focuses on behavioral 
responses including confession and reparation, and may be a more direct measure of the 
actions of guilt, but there were limited age effects for this factor. Only internalized 
behavior and concern over others' wrongdoing increased with age. The lack of findings 
for guilt behaviors such as confession may not point to a developmental reason, but may 
be a reflection of the use of maternal report. Mothers may be over-reporting the guilt 
responses of younger children. Items in these scales primarily ask parents to report 
whether their child will confess or repair damage without prompting. As Kochanska 
notes, further behavioral measures are needed to explore the development of conscience 
in young children, especially given the overlap in shame and guilt behaviors within 
scales. 
Behavioral Tests 
Although parental reports may clarify issues in the early development of self- 
conscious emotions, tests designed to elicit various behavioral responses have ecological 
validity in that they are generally more reflective of daily challenges. Using behavioral 
measures, Kochanska and colleagues (1997) investigated toddler, preschool, and early 
elementary school-aged children's internalization of rules (conscience) as assessed by 
compliance with maternal and experimenter request when supervised and unsupervised, 
and reluctance to cheat at games either alone or with peers. For example, children were 
asked by their mothers to clean up an area where they had been playing, and were 
observed with the mother present, and then absent. Using an aggregate score of 
conscience behaviors, older children showed more internalization of rules than younger 
children, and girls displayed more than boys. The authors argue that these behavioral 
measures reflect internalization since children scoring higher exhibited control even when 
adults or peers were not present. Assuming that self-regulation is a basis for conscience 
and inhibition, the relationship between these measures of conscience and inhibitory 
control was also investigated. Inhibitory control was assessed through a series of 
laboratory tasks; including "Simon says," and tasks requiring slowed motor activity such 
as walking a line slowly. Again, older children outperformed younger children and girls 
outperfornled boys in inhibitory control. Finally, maternal reports of temperamental 
inhibitory control as well as the inhibitory control measures predicted children's 
conscience behaviors at all ages (Kochanska, 1999; Kochanska et al., 1997). Although 
arguing for a temperament model for inhibitory control and its long-term effects on the 
development of conscience, these findings hrther point to the need to examine affective 
in addition to behavioral assessments of guilt and shame and their emergence in 
preschool children. 
Studies by Zahn-Waxler and colleagues have pointed to the role of guilt in helping 
behavior. When presented with various staged distress incidents, such as an adult in need 
of help, children from preschool to sixth grade showed more positive than negative affect 
when helping. In turn, their actual helping was correlated positively with the attributions 
of guilt among story characters that observe a victim in distress. In particular, when the 
story characters were portrayed as responsible for the person in need, reporting that the 
observer would feel guilt was positively correlated with actual helping. In addition, 
reporting guilt to these story characters was correlated positively with positive affect and 
negatively correlated with negative affect in the helping scenarios. The authors note that 
guilt, rather than empathy, may motivate helping since the relationship between empathy 
in story characters and helping was weaker. These findings suggest that attributions of 
personal responsibility, rather than the tendency to empathize with the victim's affective 
state, are related to increased helping (Chapman, Zahn-Waxler, Cooperman, & Iannotti, 
1987). 
Similar to guilt, the self-conscious emotions of pride and shame in preschoolers 
have been of increasing interest to researchers. As with guilt, pride and shame are 
notoriously difficult to measure through behavior, but there is con~pelling evidence that 
these emotions can be identified. Lewis and his colleagues, who have examined 
children's responses to success and failure, have led much of the research on the 
development of shame. Lewis, and colleagues (1 992) presented 3-year-old children with 
either an easy or difficult task, and found that children who failed at a seemingly easy 
task, such as putting together a puzzle with only four large pieces, displayed more shame 
than when they failed at difficult tasks, and more pride when they completed a difficult 
than an easy task. In addition, girls expressed more shame at task failure than did boys, 
but boys and girls did not differ in expressions of pride. When comparing across the task 
type, several gender differences emerged. Boys who were high in shame expressions 
were also likely to show less pride. The relationship between pride and shame was 
weaker for girls, with high shame responses correlated positively with high pride 
expressions. Lewis and colleagues argue that these reactions were not simply global 
positive and negative expressions, but also included gestural and postural features such as 
erect posture (pride) or slumped, lowered head (shame) that make the distinctions clearer 
in this measurement system. For example, shame was defined as "body collapsed, 
comers of the mouth are downwardAower lip tucked between teeth, eyes lowered with 
gaze downward or askance, withdrawal from task situation and negative self-evaluation 
(i.e., 'I'm no good at this')" (Lewis et a]., 1992, p. 632). Although children may not 
report understanding the different causal attributions that affect emotions, their reactions 
to these various situations suggest that they make these cognitive assessments, even if 
they cannot express them verbally. 
The cognitive and developmental theories presented earlier all suggest that 
although early childhood may be when guilt and shame are first fully experienced, 
precursor expressions and experiences should be apparent in toddlers. For example, 
Sroufe (1 995) argues that shame may be an early global negative evaluation that precedes 
the more context specific reaction of guilt. In a series of studies using responses to actual 
mishaps (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; Cole et al., 1992), toddlers were capable 
of experiencing shame and guilt-like reactions to everyday mishaps. These findings 
contradict the notion that shame and guilt are not differentiated until much later in 
development. Indeed, toddlers react to mishaps in ways that show a development towards 
guilt reactions to specific events, such as personally caused circumstances. 
One shortcoming of these studies is that, although two mishaps are used, neither 
point to personal responsibility nor external responsibility. The cause of the mishaps is 
unclear, although it is presumed that the child caused these mishaps. In addition, the 
limited age-range makes developmental differences difficult to assess. If preschoolers do 
have a more developed emotional reaction, then the issue of personal responsibility 
should be more important to their emotional reaction to mishaps than to toddlers' 
reactions. Toddlers' emotional and behavioral responses in these studies may be 
precursors since parents were present throughout the situations and no attempt was made 
to differentiate reactions to situations that were not the children's fault. Parental presence 
may have influenced these young children to experience a global negative feeling that 
may or may not have been internalized. If children were equally likely to respond with 
guilt or shame in that context, then it can be argued that they are not really experiencing 
guilt as it has been defined. The role of context in toddlers' emotion reactions is not 
assessed in these studies, and therefore although the findings suggest that nascent 
versions of guilt are present, they may give a clearer picture of individual differences. 
Toddlers who react with shame versus guilt may have a constellation of other behaviors 
that correspond to their tendency to blame the self. 
Individual Differences 
One reason that guilt is difficult to study is that no one situation will clearly elicit 
guilt for all children. Indeed, some children may react to a similar situation with shame. 
Although there are many possible causes for these differences in emotional style, a child's 
sense of self appears to be most important. Sroufe (1995) states that an individual's 
belief in others as caring and trustworthy creates a sense that the self is also caring and 
trustworthy. The early responsive parenting found in infancy and the toddler years will 
emerge in preschool as effective self-regulation. Early experience in the attachment 
relationship allows the child to experience personal agency that develops into an ability to 
regulate, as well as a confidence is one's regulatory abilities. Individual variations from 
optimal development will then result in generally identifiable patterns that are expressed 
as a child's coping abilities. For example, if children are forced into self-regulation 
before they are developmentally ready, they will be faced with failures. These early 
failures could create a global emotional response of rage and shame. In contrast to 
optimal development, some children are emotionally inflexible and may feel ineffective 
across situations. These early coping strategies may persist in children that are not 
equipped to handle emotionally charged situations. They may react with feelings of 
helplessness on one extreme, and anger and hostility on the other. For example, some 
preschool children may not have a sense that "things will be all right even in the face of 
challenge or stress" (Sroufe, 1995, p. 223). 
Research investigating the effects of maltreatment in childhood points to how 
early parenting practices can affect the emergence of self-conscious emotions. Alessandri 
and Lewis (1996) found that maltreated girls showed less pride and more shame than 
nonmaltreated girls. Maltreated boys showed both less pride and less shame than 
nonmaltreated boys. It appears that the punitive family styles that these children 
experience may affect their emerging sense of self and self esteem, but they may simply 
reflect greater masking of emotion in these children. Children in average or optimal 
families in contrast, may have developed a sense of self-worth because these children 
genuinely believe that they are effective in their environment. In social situations, these 
greater regulatory abilities will be reflected in greater social competence, empathy 
towards others, and greater prosocial behavior. Thompson (1 989) notes that children's 
use of attributions of personal responsibility may be affected by their history so that 
experiences of success or failure may influence the causal attributions made. 
It seems reasonable to expect that children develop different attributional 'styles' 
as a consequence of parent child-rearing practices (e.g., disciplinary procedures), 
their experiences in the broader ecology of development (e.g., inner-city versus 
middle-class settings), and perhaps also with their range of prior emotional 
experiences and temperamental style (Thompson, 1989, p. 146). 
If Sroufe's tenet that shame represents a more global and less developed emotional 
reaction for preschoolers is valid, than older preschoolers that experience shame may 
differ in their coping strategies from those who experience guilt. 
The expression of self-conscious emotions may also be linked to the basic 
emotions, which may suggest an overall coping strategy. Maternal reports of negative 
affect and anger were related to a composite measure of guilt and shame even in young 
children (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). In addition, behavioral measures of anger 
and fear at 10 months predicted guilt in 6- and 7- year-old children, suggesting that 
coping patterns do play a role in the emergence of guilt and shame. Beyond maternal 
report, it is unclear how guilt and shame were defined and assessed in this study. The 
correspondence to both internalizing and externalizing behaviors is likely due to shame 
rather than guilt tendencies, given the relationship of guilt to empathy (e.g., Chapman et 
al., 1987). 
Tangney (1995) noted, "often, the term guilt is used as a catch-all phrase to refer 
to aspects of both emotions" @. 1 132). Shame and guilt reflect divergent styles and are 
related to coping in other emotion-eliciting situations. The cognitive appraisals used in 
shame and guilt may also be used in anger-provoking situations. In a sample of middle 
childhood, adolescents, college students, and adults, guilt was related to constructive 
coping, such as a desire to fix the situation, and lower reported aggression. Shame was 
related to higher reported anger arousal, a desire for revenge, and aggressive solutions. 
This pattern held true for both direct and indirect forms of aggression. Shame-prone 
individuals also reported a greater tendency to hold their anger in, and to be angry with 
themselves (e.g., for trusting the person). Finally, shame-prone individuals were less 
optimistic about the long-tenn consequences of their anger than were guilt-prone 
individuals (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Tangney and 
colleagues argue that guilt-prone individuals may have more constructive methods of 
dealing with their anger because they may not feel a global threat to the self that 
characterizes shame. As with guilt, situations causing anger can be remedied. In 
addition, guilt has been linked to greater empathy, so the ability to take another person's 
perspective in an anger situation makes them less likely to view the other person as 
hostile or their actions as intentional. The global nature of shame makes it a more 
devastating emotion that can affect the self-esteem of the child. Guilt is more reactive to 
the situation and requires remedy. With repair, the experience of guilt does not leave the 
self damaged. The tendency to experience guilt rather than shame may be associated with 
a constellation of positive outcomes including greater social competence, prosocial 
behavior, more cooperation, and autonomy, while being lower in both internalizing and 
externalizing behaviors, anger, anxiety, aggression, isolation, and dependence. 
When examining the emotional reactions of toddlers to mishaps, Cole and 
colleagues (1992) found that chlldren could be classified by two global emotional 
responses. First, some children displayed a high degree of tension and worry, and anger. 
Second, some children displayed a high degree of sadness and low levels of joy, which 
were associated with more reparations. These emotional styles were associated with 
maternal emotional patterns, in which lower levels of the tensiodworry and anger 
dimension were associated with higher scores for maternal internalizing syrnptomatology. 
The authors hypothesized that maternal anxiety and depression may inhibit these 
emotional reactions. Since the mother was present during the testing, these children may 
not have wanted their mothers to become concerned over the mishap, or may not have 
expected her to react to their own concern. When these children were then classified into 
two groups "avoiders" and "amenders," guilt-relevant responses were higher for the 
latter, and shame-relevant responses were higher for the former (Barrett et al., 1993). 
Further, boys were more likely to be classified as "amenders" than were girls, and girls 
were more likely to be classified as "avoiders" than were boys. 
Finally, the role of temperament in the development of conscience has been 
investigated through maternal reports and behavioral observations. Both methodologies 
reveal that efforthl control, as discussed earlier, is associated with the emergence of 
guilt, with children lower in efforthl control being more likely to engage in prohibited 
acts, and less likely to be remorsehl (e.g., Kochanska et al., 1997; Rothbart et al., 1994). 
Again, the overlap between guilt and shame makes these data difficult to judge, but it 
suggests that children who are more prosocial and exhibit fewer externalizing behaviors 
would be less likely to engage in prohibited acts. In addition, these children may have 
inadequate skills for coping with mishaps. Across these studies, clearly children's 
tendencies to react to situations with shame or guilt has implications for the way other 
situations are handled, and may therefore have an impact on their social development. 
Summary 
Although psychologists cite guilt and shame as important in development, these 
emotions have received little research attention until recently. This may be partly due to 
the difficulty in operationalizing and separating these emotions. Recent research, though, 
has found that shame and guilt are indeed separate constructs, however they can be 
elicited from the same situations. Although shame experiences rely on an attribution of 
the self as defective, guilt requires a focus on the behavior (or nonbehavior). Theorists 
have argued for various developmental courses for these emotions, yet little systematic 
study of their emergence has been conducted. Sroufe (1 995) argued that shame, a more 
global reaction, acts as a precursor to the emergence of the capacity for guilt in preschool 
children. Hofhan  (1983) added that shame relies on a belief that the misdeed was 
uncontrollable, so that the focus of the self-rebuke is directed at the self, not the action. 
The capacity for guilt emerges from the belief that the action was controllable (e.g., a lack 
of effort at task failure), and is therefore reparable. Thus, the capacity to experience guilt 
develops from empathy, in which children begin to understand that they can be the cause 
of another person's distress. 
The prerequisite to moving from a state of global shame to that of guilt then 
requires that the child be able to see another's perspective, and be able to understand why 
an event occurred, rather than focusing solely on the outcome of one's actions. The 
developmental course of shame and guilt has received little research attention, though, 
with various researchers arguing for different ages at which these emotions emerge. Most 
researchers agree that the ability to focus on individual responsibility, rather than the 
outcome of the event, is not present in children under 8 years old (e.g., Graham et al., 
1984; Saarni et al., 1998; Stipek & DeCotis, 1988). However, research investigating the 
emergence of guilt has primarily used interviews or hypothetical situations to assess these 
age changes, and therefore is arguably only assessing the child's understanding of the 
differences between shame and guilt, rather than a behavioral tendency to differentiate 
these emotions. 
The alternative, studying guilt and shame in behavioral tests, is plagued with 
difficulties. There are few situations that are capable of eliciting guilt in most children; 
they may elicit shame instead (e.g., Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Tangney, 1995). 
Observational studies of the emergence of guilt have shown that toddlers are capable of 
guilt-like reactions to mishaps (e.g., Cole et al., 1992). In these studies by Cole and 
colleagues, responses to the broken toy by toddlers supports the idea that, not only are 
precursors to shame and guilt apparent at this age, but also that children will respond with 
different emotions to the same situation. Results indicate that some toddlers responded 
with shame-like responses and others with guilt-like responses. The continued 
differentiation of these emotions remains unclear. In addition, studies across the toddler 
period as well as middle childhood demonstrate that children experience more guilt with 
age, and that guilt is associated with positive adjustment, whereas shame is associated 
with internalizing behaviors. The emergence of guilt in the preschool period is relatively 
unstudied, making the developmental course of this emotion, as well as its relation to 
social and emotional adjustment, unclear. Anecdotal evidence suggests that preschoolers 
are able to distinguish between events that they have caused versus those where they do 
not have direct responsibility. 
Finally, gender differences have been reported in several studies. For example, 2- 
year-old boys were more often classified as exhibiting guilt-like reactions than were girls 
(Barrett et al., 1993), and 3-year-old girls displayed more shame than did boys (Lewis et 
al., 1992). Studies of older children have found that girls report more guilt than boys, and 
that their feelings are more intense (e.g., Evans, 1984; Kugler & Jones, 1992; Tangney, 
1990). Bybee (1998) notes that gender differences in the intensity and frequency of guilt 
are not stable until adolescence, when females consistently report more guilt and more 
intense experiences of guilt. It is unclear whether boys exhibit more guilt than girls 
before adolescence, when these gender differences reverse, or whether these patterns are 
simply unstable in younger children. As such, it may be difficult to interpret gender 
differences that emerge in younger children. 
The Present Study 
In the present study, I propose that the capacity for expressing guilt as a separate 
emotion emerges during the preschool period, with older preschoolers showing more guilt 
in situations in which their personal responsibility is clearer. Using a modified version of 
Cole and colleagues' (1992) mishap paradigm, preschoolers were presented with one of 
two conditions that varied in the degree of personal responsibility. The mishap paradigm 
was modified to adjust for the preschoolers' abilities and therefore parents were not 
present during testing. 
Basic Design 
The study was a 3 (age: 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children) X 2 (responsibility: 
ambiguous versus personal responsibility) factorial design. Age and responsibility were 
between-subjects factors. First, the ambiguous responsibility condition consisted of the 
experimenter placing a broken toy (named as a toy belonging to the experimenter) in the 
room so that the child could play with it. To lower the degree of personal responsibility, 
the child was told that the toy might have already been broken. Second, in the personal 
responsibility condition, the child was given no information that the toy was broken. 
Parent and teacher measures regarding social and emotional adjustment were also 
collected. 
Dependent Variables 
When children in either condition played with the toy and the toy "broke," coders 
rated the children's reactions on a series of behavioral (e.g., latency to repair the toy) and 
emotional (e.g., global ratings of affect) categories. Composite scores were also 
calculated on behavioral measures and affective expressions. 
Individual Differences 
In addition, to assess individual differences in shame and guilt behaviors, the 
following measures were collected: parental reports of children's shame and guilt and 
teacher ratings of children's social and emotional adjustment. 
Developmental Hypotheses 
Based on the above theory and literature, the following developmental hypotheses 
were derived: 
1. According to Sroufe's (1995) theory of shame and guilt, sha l e  is a more 
global and less developmentally advanced emotion, and therefore is hypothesized to be 
more apparent in young children. Younger preschool children were therefore expected to 
show a) more avoidance behaviors (i.e., longer latencies to repair the toy and to comment 
that the toy is broken; more frequent gaze aversion, more avoiding of the toy and of the 
experimenter), b) more affective discomfort (i.e., more tensionlwony and anger, but 
lower sadness), and c) higher composite scores of avoidance (i.e., total number of times 
turned away from the toy, total number of gaze aversions, and total number of times the 
child moves to another part of the room). This pattern of results predicted a main effect 
for age such that younger preschool children were hypothesized to show more shame- 
related behaviors and affect than older preschool children regardless of the responsibility 
condition. 
2. Since guilt is defined as a resulting from a feeling of personal responsibility 
(e.g., Tangney, 1995; Weiner & Graham, 1989), it was hypothesized that children would 
display more guilt than shame in the personal responsibility condition than in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition. This main effect for responsibility condition was 
expected to be apparent regardless of children's ages. 
3. With respect to developmental trends within conditions, the following 
interactions were hypothesized: a) 4-year-olds would display more guilt in the personal 
responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, b) 4-year-olds 
would display more guilt in the personal responsibility condition than would 2- or 3-year- 
old children, c) 3-year-olds would display more guilt in the personal responsibility 
condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, d) 2-year-olds would not differ 
in the amount of guilt and shame displayed in personal and ambiguous responsibility 
conditions, and e) 2-year-old children would show more shame in the personal 
responsibility condition than would 3- or 4-year-old children. 
Individual Difference Hypotheses 
Research and theory suggest that guilt may be a more adaptive coping mechanism 
than shame, and therefore children who are prone to experience shame rather than guilt 
may also differ on other dimensions, so that shame and guilt may act as an individual, in 
addition to a developmental, difference. Shame-prone children were defined as those 
who score below the median on amending and above the median on avoiding. Guilt- 
prone children were defined as those who score above the median on amending and 
below the median on avoiding. In order to assess the possible relationship between guilt 
or shame-prone responding and children's coping patterns, it was hypothesized that: 
4. With regard to gender, it was hypothesized that boys would be more likely to 
be classified as guilt-prone than girls, and girls would be more likely to be classified as 
shame-prone than boys. 
5. Since shame has been found to be associated with higher levels of anger, 
aggression, tension and worry, shame-prone children were hypothesized to exhibit more 
internalizing and externalizing behaviors, and to be higher in anxiety, anger, and 
aggression, and lower in prosocial behavior as assessed by the Social Competence and 
Behavior Evaluation (SCBE; LaFreniere, Dumas, Capuano, & Dubeau, 1992) than guilt- 
prone children. Across studies, guilt has been associated with lower aggression, more 
constructive coping with anger, and increased empathy and prosocial behavior. 
Therefore, guilt-prone children were expected to exhibit less anger and aggression, and to 
exhibit more secure, prosocial, cooperative, and autonomous behaviors. Finally guilt- 
prone children were expected to score higher on summary scores of social competence 
and lower on internalizing or externalizing behaviors than shame-prone children. 
6. With respect to the My Child, (Kochanska, DeVet, Goldrnan, Murray, & 
Putnam, 1994), it was hypothesized that guilt-prone children would score higher on the 
factor Active Moral RegulationNigilance, and on the following scales: Confession, 
ReparationsIAmends, Concern/Correct others, Internalized conduct. Shame-prone 
children were expected to score higher on the factor Affective Discomfort, and on the 





Sixty-one children in three age groups (20 two-year-olds, 21 three-year-olds, and 
20 four-year-olds, M = 42 months; SD = 10.2; min = 24, max = 58) were matched for 
gender (See Table 1). Participants were recruited fiom university laboratory nursery 
classrooms and area preschool centers, with a participation rate of approximately 50 
percent. Participants were from predominantly white (n= 54), middle- and working-class 
families living in small Maine and Maryland communities. 
Informed Consent 
Parents were contacted before the testing sessions and asked to participate in a 
study that would examine the development of children's emotional responses. Parents 
were told that their children would be videotaped to ensure that brief expressive reactions 
could later be coded, and that videotapes would remain confidential. Parents were asked 
to sign an informed consent form that described the nature of the study (See Appendix 
A). In addition, each child was informed at the beginning of the experimental session that 
he or she could withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. 
Apparatus 
A video recorder with a zoom lens was placed unobtrusively either in the testing 
room or in an adjoining room to videotape each participant's behavior during the 
experimental session. 
Table 1 
Number of Participants by Age and Gender 
Age I Girls Boys 
Questionnaire Measures 
A questionnaire assessing the emotional characteristics of their child (i.e., My 
Child; Kochanska et al., 1994) was given to each parent at the child's preschool or 
daycare. Parents were instructed to return the forms to the teacher or preschool director. 
After two weeks, parents were given written reminders to return the questionnaires to the 
day care center. In addition, teachers completed one questionnaire (i.e., SCBE; LaFreniere 
et al., 1992) designed to assess preschool children's social competence, which took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete for each child. 
My Child 
To assess children's guilt and related behaviors, parents were asked to complete 
the My Child scale (Kochanska et al., 1994). My Child is a 100-item questionnaire that 
measures the development of conscience along two dimensions: affective discomfort and 
active moral regulation or self-restraint. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert type scale 
with the additional option of "not applicable." Ten individual scales within My Child 
include: 1) guilt, remorselother emotional reactions after transgression, mishap, 
wrongdoing; 2) concern over good feelings with parent after wrongdoing; 3) confession; 
4) apology andor promise not to do it anymore; 5) reparationslamends; 6) 
concendcorrections occasioned by others' transgressions; 7) internalized conduct; 8) 
empathic, prosocial responses to another's distress; 9) symbolic reproduction owdealing 
with wrongdoing; and 10) sensitivity to flawed or damaged objectslthemes of 
wrongdoing. Test-retest reliability of individual scales as assessed by the Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation ranges from .10 (symbolic reproduction) to .79 (confession), 
with most scales averaging about .65. Further, My Child has been demonstrated to have 
significant correspondence to behavioral measures of self control. Finally, My Child was 
found to have alpha reliabilities ranging from .35 (sensitivity to flawed objects) to .90 
(internalized conduct), with most scales averaging about .75. Due to the low reliability 
and validity of several scales, the author created a second version of the measure. Alpha 
reliabilities calculated on the second version ranged from .59 (sensitivity to flawed or 
damaged objects, themes of wrongdoing) to .93 (symbolic reproduction ofldealing with 
wrongdoing), with most scales averaging about .86. Test-retest reliability was not 
conducted on the second version (Kochanska et al., 1994) (See Appendix B). 
Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation Inventory 
Teacher ratings of affective expression, social competence, and adjustment 
difficulties were assessed using the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation 
Inventory (SCBE; LaFreniere et al., 1992). The SCBE is an 80-item questionnaire 
presented in a 6-point Likert type format completed by teachers and describes typical 
preschooler behavior. Children were assessed according to the eight basic scales of the 
SCBE: depressive-joyful, anxious-secure, angry-tolerant, isolated-integrated, aggressive- 
calm, egotistical-prosocial, oppositional-cooperative, and dependent-autonomous. 
Interrater reliability for the scales calculated using Spearman-Brown estimates are 
unifom~ly high, ranging from .72 to 39 .  Internal consistency of the scales as assessed 
with Cronbach's alpha is also uniformly high, ranging from .79 to .91. Children's overall 
adjustment was also assessed using the three summary scores of the SCBE: social 
competence, internalizing, and externalizing behavior problems (See Appendix C). 
Behavioral Paradigm 
Each child was tested in a modified version of Cole and colleagues (1 992) mishap 
paradigm, and participants were randomly assigned to one of two situations that varied in 
their degree of responsibility. Participants in each age group and each condition were 
matched for gender. In both conditions, the experimenter introduced the toy to the child 
by demonstrating how the toy could be played with (such as moving the arms). 
Experimental sessions (M = 12 1 seconds with the broken doll) were videotaped for later 
coding. 
.Ambiguous Responsibility 
Children were told that the toy might be already broken to reduce the likelihood 
that the child would feel that he or she was personally responsible for the toy breaking 
(See Appendix D). 
Personal Responsibilitv 
In the personal responsibility condition, children were also told that the toy 
belongs to the experimenter, but the experimenter did not mention that the toy might be 
already broken. The lack of information that the toy was broken was intended to induce 
feelings of personal responsibility when the child "broke" the toy. 
Procedure 
Each child was individually tested in one experimental session that lasted 
approximately 10 minutes. In order to increase the likelihood that children's emotional 
reactions were due to the experimental session rather than being in an unfamiliar setting, 
no child was tested until the experimenter had built rapport with that child. All testing 
was completed in the child's preschool either in their regular classroom or in a nearby 
room, and an adult that was known to the child conducted each session. Experimental 
sessions began with several minutes of play, initiated when the experimenter brought 
several toys out of a toy box. At the end of the warm up period, the experimenter placed 
the toys back in the toy box and introduced the experimentally manipulated toy. 
The experimenter placed a Fisher-Price Sesame Street Clap-Hands Elmo doll 
(named as a toy belonging to the experimenter) on a table in front of the child. After the 
child played with the toy for several minutes, the experimenter explained that she had to 
leave the room for a moment, but would be right back. The experimenter then put the toy 
back in the toy box. The experimenter then told the child that he or she could play with 
the toy while she was in the other room, at which time the experimenter placed a 
seemingly identical experimental toy in front of the child. The toy was experimentally 
manipulated so that the arm of the doll fell off when the child pulled its arms together to 
make its hands clap. During the warm up period, children were shown how to make the 
toy clap its hands, so that during the experimental session, they would clap its hands and 
cause the toy to break a few seconds after they began playing with it. Children were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions prior to the experimental session (personal 
responsibility and ambiguous responsibility). Experimental sessions were divided into 
two segments: alone and when the experimenter returned. 
Alone 
In both conditions, children were left alone in the testing room for the initial play 
period when the child "broke" the toy, although they were being unobtrusively observed. 
The length of time that the child was left alone in the room varied depending on how long 
the child could engage in self-directed behavior, and was ended if the child left the room, 
appeared distressed, or never broke the toy. No child was left alone for longer than 
approximately 2 minutes (min =9, max = 147, and M = 68 sec). 
Experimenter Returns 
After the child's initial reaction to the mishap occurred, the experimenter returned 
to the room and appeared to be working with some papers. In order to allow children a 
chance to confess without prompting, the experimenter initially made no comments to the 
child but did notice that the toy was broken. The experimenter then asked the neutral 
question "what happened," followed by a reminder that the toy is the experimenter's 
favorite and the statement "that's too bad." 
After the child's response to the experimenter pronlpts (M = 55 sec) and the end 
of the experimental session, the child was informed that the experimenter had 
inadvertently given him or her a toy that was already broken before the child began 
playing with it, and got the unbroken toy out of the toy box. To further reduce any 
negative feelings the child may have had, the experimenter "fixed" the experimentally 
manipulated toy and let the child play with the original toy again. Children were then 
given a chance to play with other toys, given a sticker or small prize for their 
participation, and then were escorted back to their classroom. Children were not given 
explicit instructions not to tell their classmates about the testing, as it was unlikely that 
they would discuss the broken toy. One child did not pick up the toy to play with it, and 
became emotionally upset when left alone. This child's data were not included in any 
analyses. 
Coding of the Videotapes 
Two trained observers who were blind to the study's hypotheses completed all 
coding. Coders, who were unfamiliar with the children in this study, consisted of 
developmental-clinical graduate students from an emotional development laboratory. 
Coders were trained to a criterion of 80% agreement before actual coding scores were 
collected. Observer agreement was retested at random points to maintain inter-rater 
agreement of at least 80% for all behavioral categories. Disagreements among coders 
were examined for any systematic patterns (e.g., rating tensiodworry as sadness), and the 
coders were retrained to the original criteria. See Appendix E for a complete description 
of the coding system used. The following categories were used to classify children's 
responses: 
Affective Codes 
Affective expressions were coded along five affective dimensions: positive affect, 
anger, distress, tensiodworry, and blends. All affective categories included postural, 
facial, and vocal indices of affect. Positive affect (joy) was coded when a child smiled 
broadly, laughed, or giggled. Anger was coded when a child expressed frustration 
through harsh vocalizations, clenched teeth, tightly pressed lips, or stamping feet. Sadness 
was defined as sorrowful expressions or crying. Tensiodworry was used to describe 
emotional blends not characteristic of a discrete emotion, but indicative of anxiety or 
tension, such as fidgety movements, tensing of facial muscles, and strained vocalizations. 
Blends were coded when two or more of the above emotions, or other basic emotions 
such as fear or disgust, were present in the same expression. Coders indicated which 
emotions were present in the blended expression. Neutral affective expressions consisted 
of a lack of vocal, postural, or facial expressions, but a calm demeanor, and were not 
coded (See Table 2). Other basic emotions such as fear and disgust were coded, but were 
expected to occur in low frequency. Baseline affective expressions were coded for the 
last one-minute of the warm up period when the experimenter presented the toy to the 
child. These baseline affective expressions were contrasted with 1) affective expressions 
when alone, and 2) affective expressions when the experimenter reentered and prompted 
the child. 
Affective codes were calculated as the total number of seconds that each category 
was present divided by the total number of seconds that the child was present, resulting in 
a rate of expression calculated for each affective category. Baseline rates for each 
affective code were subtracted from affective rates alone and affective rates when the 
experimenter returned. Affective coding began when the child discovered that the toy 
was broken. In addition, coders rated the intensity of the affective expression for each 
category. Coders rated each affect along a 2-point scale (1 = mild, 2 = full). Finally, 
coders rated each child's global affective reaction at the conclusion of the experimental 
session as either regulated or dysregulated. 
Reparations and Avoidance 
Coding of reparations and avoidance consisted of two separate segments: alone and 
with the experimenter present. The following behaviors were used when the child was 
alone, with timed variables beginning when the child first noticed that the toy was 
broken: latency to repair, latency to comment on the broken toy, latency to gaze at the 
Table 2 
Facial. Vocal, and Postural Indicators of Affective Categories 
Affective 
Category Facial Vocal Postural 
Positive smiling, wrinkling giggling, increased relaxed muscles, 
Affect around eyes pitch, laughing loose posture 
Anger narrowed eyes, lips harsh, loud tightened muscles, 
pressed and narrow clenched fists 
Sadness eyes lowered, lips softened tone and sunken posture, 
turned down volume, crying head down 
Tension1 alert, nervous twitches, strained, nervous, fidgety, tense posture 
worry tense facial muscles jumpy 
Neutral calm, no major activity calm, relaxed, calm, attentive 
not excited 
- - - 
Adapted from Cole et al. (1992). 
experimenter, avoiding toy, and avoiding experimenter (See Table 3). Baseline behavioral 
reactions (self-comfort, experimenter avoidance, and gaze aversion) were coded for the 
last minute of the initial period when the experimenter demonstrated how to play with the 
toy. 
Reactions to the broken toy were coded according to behavioral and linguistic 
indices, with reparations defined as attempts to repair the toy, seeking help, or 
commenting on the broken toy and its need for repair. Avoidance was defined as gaze 
aversion, turning away from the toy, or moving to another part of the room. Coders 
recorded a total frequency score for both reparations and avoidance so that children could 
have as few as zero occurrences of each behavioral category. In order to assess individual 
differences in shame-prone and guilt-prone responding, measures of avoidance and 
reparations were dichotomized into guilt-prone or shame-prone responding. 
Table 3 
Behavioral Measures of Reparation and Avoidance 
Behavioral Measure Definition 
Reparations 
Latency to repair Number of seconds before attempting to repair the toy 
Latency to comment Number of seconds before verbalizing that the toy is broken 
Avoidance 
Gaze aversion Number of seconds from when experimenter returns before 
looking at the experimenter, excluding when the door first 
opens 
Toy avoidance Number of seconds with body turned away from the toy 
Experimenter avoidance Number of seconds with body turned away from 
experimenter after the experimenter re-enters the room 




A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was en~ployed to assess 
differences in emotion and behavior between 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children (i.e., Age), 
and between children in the personal and ambiguous responsibility conditions (i.e., 
Condition). Separate MANOVAs were used for the emotion variables and behavior 
variables since the MANOVA is designed not only to protect against Type I error rates, 
but also to analyze variables that are conceptualized as inter-related (Stevens, 1996). 
Significant effects in the MANOVA were further explored using Tukey's HSD. Tukey's 
acts as a protection factor for inflated Type I error rates when examining all pairwise 
combinations (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000). Chi-square analyses were also conducted on 
several nominal behavioral variables (e.g., confession) due to their nonparametric nature 
(Myers & Well, 1995). Finally, children were classified into mutually exclusive groups 
based on measures of avoidance so that emotional and behavioral differences between 
these groups could be examined. 
In regards to individual differences, the effectiveness of the guilt and shame-prone 
dichotomy was first examined through a Discriminant Function Analysis @FA). One of 
the major purposes of the DFA is to examine linear combinations of variables that are 
used to classify subjects into groups. In the present study, the DFA was employed to 
examine the importance of emotion and behavior variables in discriminating between 
guilt and shame-prone responding. As such, the DFA was employed primarily to aid in 
the interpretation of group differences rather than to classify unknown cases (Klecka, 
1982). If the dichotomization of subjects into these groups based on a small subset of 
variables (e.g., gaze aversion) is acceptable, then the DFA should accurately predict the 
same group membership from a larger pool of variables (i.e., emotion and behavior 
variables). 
Analyses of the guilt and shame-prone dichotomy were further examined through 
three separate analyses. First, independent samples t-tests were conducted on the 
relationship between guilt and shame-prone responding with affective and behavioral 
variables that were hypothesized to be related to these groups. Second, to determine the 
relationship between guilt and shame and overall social and emotional functioning, 
independent samples t-tests were conducted on the individual scales and summary scores 
of the SCBE. In particular, the relationship between positive adaptation to the preschool 
with guilt-prone responding, and negative adaptation with shame-prone responding was 
investigated. Finally, the relationship between guilt- and shame-prone responding and 
maternal reports of conscience was explored through analyses of the relationship between 
these groups and the individual scales and overall factors of the My Child. Scores on the 
My Child were analyzed for concurrent validity of the guilt and shame-prone dichotomy. 
For instance, the relationship between guilt and maternal reports of amending behaviors 
such as confession and apology was explored through independent samples t-tests. 
Before addressing individual hypotheses, the reliability of the My Child and 
SCBE, as well as inter-rater agreement for all emotion and behavior variables will be 
addressed. In addition, preliminary analyses suggested that emotion variables violated 
assumptions of normality necessary for parametric statistics to be performed, so data 
transformations were employed. The nature and extent of these transformations will be 
described before the results of the hypothesis testing are described. 
Internal Consistency Reliability of the Questionnaire Measures 
Preliminary analyses of the questionnaire measures were performed before 
individual hypotheses were tested. Scale internal consistency reliabilities were computed 
on the My Child and SCBE (Cronbach, 195 1). The 100-item My Child scale assessed the 
development of conscience in toddlers and preschool children, as rated by parents. The 
overall My Child scale, and the two factors of affective discomfort and active moral 
regulation or restraint produced coefficient alphas of .94, .8 1, and .91 respectively. 
Cronbach's alpha calculated on individual scales ranged from .69 to .98 (see Table 4). 
The 80-item SCBE assessed teacher rated social and emotional adjustment to the 
preschool. Scale reliabilities computed on the three summary scores of social 
competence, internalizing, and externalizing behavior problems produced coefficient 
alphas of .95, 86, and .94 respectively. Internal consistency reliabilities conlputed on the 8 
scales ranged from .77 to .90 (see Table 5). 
Data Transformations 
Given the large positive skew for affective categories (e.g., joy, anger, sadness, 
tension/worry, and blends) all variables were normalized and ranked using Tukey's 
procedure. Affective expressions were heavily skewed, and therefore had large standard 
deviations since these variables have no upper limit and a fixed lower limit (See Table 6). 
Myers and Well (1995) note that analysis of skewed data seriously affects power; 
Table 4 
Internal Consistency Reliabilities of My Child Scales 
Scale (Number of Items) Alpha 
Guilt, remorselother emotional 
reactions after transgression (1 8). ......................... 84 
Concern over good feelings 
with parent after wrongdoing (8). ......................... 75 
Confession (7). ................................................... 78 
Apology andlor promise not to 
do it anymore (6). .................................... 86 
Reparationslamends (9). ........................................ 70 
Concern~corrections occasioned 
by others7 transgressions (7). .............................. 84 
Internalized conduct (20). ...................................... 86 
Empathic, prosocial responses 
to another's distress (13). ................................... 80 
Symbolic reproduction oudealing 
with wrongdoing (5). ....................................... 98 
Sensitivity to flawed or damaged 
....................... objectslthemes of wrongdoing (7). 69 
Table 5 
Internal Consistency Reliabilities of Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation 
Inventory Scales 
Scale (Number of Items) Alpha 
Depressive.joyf51(10) ........................... 77 
Anxious-secure (1 0) ............................. 82 
Angry-tolerant (10) .............................. 90 
Isolated-integrated (10) .......................... 85 
Aggressive-calm (1 0) ............................ 83 
Egotistical-prosocial (1 0) ........................ 81 
.................. Oppositional-cooperative (1 0) 83 
Dependent-autonomous (1 0) ................... 77 
Table 6 
Means and St andard Deviati s by Age for Affective Categ 
60 
ories a Alone and with 
Experimenter Present 
Affective Category M SD M SD M SD 
Alone 
Mild Joy -21.67 
Full Joy -0.26 
Mild Anger 0.25 
Full Anger 0.00 
Mild Sadness 4.35 
Full Sadness 1.20 
Mild TensionNony 16.99 
Full TensionNony 3.94 
Sadness and 
TensionNony Blend 2.25 
Experimenter Present 
Mild Joy -20.75 12.54 -24.95 12.43 
Full JOY -0.65 1.87 -0.55 0.92 
Mild Anger 0.31 1.28 0.00 0.00 
Full Anger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mild Sadness 9.73 9.79 10.42 11.04 
Full Sadness 2.13 6.37 1.43 6.55 
Mild TensionNony 20.17 12.06 15.65 12.89 
Full TensionNony 0.54 2.12 -0.19 0.87 
Sadness and 
TensionNony Blend 0.86 3.83 6.94 8.35 
a Affective categories are reported as rates per minute corrected fkom baseline. 
therefore ranks should be utilized for all analyses of this type of data. Behavioral 
categories did not exhibit the same degree of skew, and therefore these data were not 
transformed. 
Hypothesis 1 : Age Differences 
According to Sroufe's (1995) theory of emotional development, shame is a more 
global and less developmentally advanced emotion than guilt, and therefore was 
hypothesized to appear earlier in development. Therefore, younger preschool children 
were expected to show a) more avoidance behaviors (i.e., longer latencies to repair the 
toy and to comment that the toy is broken; more frequent gaze aversion, more avoiding of 
the toy and of the experimenter), b) more affective discomfort related to shame (i.e., more 
tensiodwony and anger, but lower sadness), and c) higher composite scores of avoidance 
(i.e., total number of times turned away from the toy, total number of gaze aversions, and 
total number of times the child changes positions in the room). This pattern of emotional 
and behavioral reactions reflects a main effect for age such that younger preschool 
children were expected to show more shanle-related behaviors and affect than would 
older preschool children regardless of the responsibility condition. 
To test this, a 2 (responsibility) X 3 (age) multiple analysis of variance was 
conducted. Affective categories (positive affect, anger, sadness, tensiodwony, and 
blends) served as the dependent variables. A second 2 (responsibility) X 3 (age) 
MANOVA was conducted with behaviors (e.g., latency to repair, latency to comment, 
gaze aversion) serving as the dependent variables. Results are presented in terms of 
emotions and behaviors when the child was initially alone, and then when the 
experimenter returned to the room, so that reactions to an audience can be distinguished 
from those without an audience. 
Alone 
Previous research has indicated that tensiodworry is related to shame-like 
reactions, and therefore it was hypothesized that it would decrease with age. As 
expected, results indicated that expressions of full tensiodwony varied as a function of 
age, F (2,55) = 3.46, p < .05, eta2 = .112. Post Hoc tests revealed that 2-year-olds 
expressed more full tensiodworry than did 3-year-olds (M = +0.26 and -0.15, 
respectively), LSD = .410, p < .05. There was no significant difference between 2- and 4- 
year-olds or 3- and 4-year-olds in expressions of full tensiodworry (See Figure 1). These 
age effects indicate that 2-year-olds expressed significantly more full expressions of 
tensiodworry. No other affective variables, including all guilt-relevant variables such as 
sadness, were significantly different as a b c t i o n  of age. 
Analyses of behavioral measures revealed that latency to repair varied as a 
function of age, F (2, 55) = 4.69, p < .05, eta2 = .146. Post Hoc tests revealed that 2-year- 
olds had longer latencies to repair than 4-year-olds (M = 15.25 and 2.85 sec, 
respectively), HSD = 12.40, p < .05. There was a trend for 2-year-olds to have longer 
latencies to repair than 3-year-olds (M = 15.25 and 2.85 sec, respectively), HSD = 11 .do, 
p < .06, but 3-year-olds did not differ from 4-year-olds, HSD = 0.96, n.s. (See Figure 3). 
No other behavioral measures of avoiding or amending were significantly different based 
on the subject's age. 
Figure 1 
Expressions of Full TensionIWorry when Alone as a Function of Age 
Figure 2 
Exvressions of Sadness and TensionlWory Blends when the Experimenter Returned 
as a Function of Age 
Figure 3 
Latency to Repair as a Function of Age 
16 
Experimenter Returned 
Analyses of affective expressions when the experimenter returned to the room 
showed few overall age effects. However, blends of sadness and tensiodwony did differ 
significantly with age, F (2, 55) = 7.08, p < .01, eta2 = .205. Post Hoc tests revealed that 
2-year-olds expressed less sadness and tensiodwony than did 3- year-olds, LSD = -35 1, 
p < .001, and 4-year-olds, LSD = -.45 1, p < .05. There was a trend for 3-year-olds to 
express more sadness and tensiodwony blends than 4-year-olds, LSD = .399, p < .08 
(See Figure 2). This finding may not be in contrast to the decrease in tensiodwony with 
age that was seen when the child was alone given that tensiodwony was blended with 
sadness, a guilt-relevant emotional expression. When comparing Figures 1 and 2, the data 
suggest that although all children displayed tensiodwony, only 2-year-olds did not blend 
this emotion with sadness. 
Analyses of behavioral data revealed a main effect of age for several variables 
related to overall patterns of avoidance, particularly toy avoidance and avoiding the 
experimenter. First, toy avoidance varied as a function of age, F (2, 55) = 3.27, p < .05, 
eta2 = .106. A Least Squares Difference (LSD) test was performed in order to further 
explore this overall age difference. As seen in Figure 4, results revealed that 2-year-olds 
showed more toy avoidance than 3-year-olds (Ms = 7.65 and 0.67 sec respectively), LSD 
= 6.98, p <.05, and 4-year-olds (M = 0.55 sec), LSD = 7.10, p <.05. In addition, avoiding 
the experimenter varied as a function of age, F (2,55) = 4.03, p < .05, eta2 = .128. Post 
hoc tests revealed that 2-year-olds displayed more avoidance of the experimenter than did 
4-year-olds (Ms = 3.92 and 0.13 respectively), HSD = 3.79, p < .05. There was a trend for 
Figure 4 
Toy Avoidance as a Function of Age 
Figure 5 
Experimenter Avoidance as a Function of Age 
2-year-olds to display more avoidance of the experimenter than 3-year-olds (M = 0.13), 
HSD = 3.36, p < .06, but 3-year-olds did not differ from 4-year-olds, HSD = 0.43, n.s. 
(See Figure 5). 
Chi-square analyses were conducted on nominal behavioral categories 
(commenting before or after prompting, denyinglminimizing, confessing, emotion 
regulation, and shame-guiltfprone). There were no age differences in emotion regulation 
(i.e., regulated or dysregulated), x2 (2) = 2.17, n.s., commenting either before or after 
being prompting, x2 (2) = 3.26, n.s., denyinglminimizing before prompting, x2 (2) = 2.50, 
n.s., denyinglminimizing after prompting, x2 (2) = 0.1 1, n.s., or confessing before 
prompting, x2 (2) = 1.83, n.s. Only 5 children confessed before being prompted, whereas 
21 confessed after being prompted. There was a weak trend for confessing after being 
prompted to vary with age, with 4-year-olds being more likely to confess than 2- or 3- 
year-olds x2 (2) = 4.99, p < .09, but few children confessed. It should be noted that 
children could confess both before and after being prompted. One 2-year-old, one 3-year- 
old, and three 4-year-olds confessed both before and after being prompted by the 
experimenter (See Table 7). 
The classification of guilt- and shame-prone responding was originally planned to 
include measures of avoidance and reparation as the criteria. For example, children 
scoring above the median in reparation and below the median in avoidance would be 
classified as guilt-prone. However, using this classification system, only 7 children were 
classified as guilt-prone, so a less stringent criterion was established. Given that only 33% 
of children confessed, but experimenter avoidance or gaze aversion were common among 
Table 7 
Number of Children Who Confessed Before and After Prompting as a Function of Aae 
Age Before Prompt After Prompta No confessionb 
It should be noted that children could confess both before and after being prompted. 
One 2-year-old, one 3-year-old, and three 4-year-olds confessed both before and after 
being prompted by the experimenter. 
children, only avoidance but not reparation was used to create these groupings. As noted 
earlier, the distribution of gaze aversion and experimenter avoidance were both positively 
skewed (skew = 1.92, SE = .306, and skew = 3.31, SE = .306, respectively), 
therefore groups were dichotomized based on the median rather than the mean score 
(Myers & Well, 1995). 
Since reparation was not included as a means of dichotomizing groups, labeling 
these grouping as shame- and guilt-prone may be unwarranted at this time. Participants 
scoring above the median in gaze aversion or experimenter avoidance were classified as 
avoidant (Mdns = 0.67 and 1.52 per min., respectively). Participants scoring below the 
median in gaze aversion or experimenter avoidance were classified using the more neutral 
term nonavoidant. Of the 61 participants, 26 were classified as nonavoidant and 35 were 
classified as avoidant. Avoidant responding varied as a function of age, x2 (2) = 9.41, p < 
.01, with 2-year-olds more likely to be classified as avoidant and 4-year-olds more likely 
to be classified as nonavoidant (See Table 8). Follow-up analyses using Pearson's 
Contingency Coefficient were conducted to determine the strength of the relationship 
between age and classification. Pearson's Contingency Coefficient is a nonparametric 
statistic similar to the Spearn~an that describes the strength of the relationship between 
nominal variables (Runyon, Haber, Pittenger, & Coleman, 1996). Analyses revealed that 
there was a moderate degree of association between age and classification (cc = .37, p 
<.01). 
Table 8 
Number of Children Classified as Avoidant and Nonavoidant as a Function of Age 
Age Nonavoidant Avoidant Total 
4-year-olds 14 
Total 26 
Hypothesis 2: Responsibility and Affective Expressions 
Since guilt is being defined as resulting fiom a feeling of personal responsibility 
(e.g., Tangney, 1995; Weiner & Graham, 1989), it was hypothesized that children would 
display more guilt than shame in the personal responsibility condition than in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition. This main effect for condition should be apparent 
even when collapsing across age groups. Several affective expressions relevant to guilt 
and shame did differ as a function of the responsibility condition, but these results were 
contrary to the hypotheses stated above. 
Alone 
Expressions of joy have been noted as decreasing more substantially in instances 
of guilt rather than shame. As expected, expressions of full joy had a larger decrease 
fiom baseline in the personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition (M = -0.26 and 0.14, respectively), F (1, 55) = 4.01, p = .05, eta2 
= .068. All other guilt and shame relevant emotion variables failed to reach significance. 
Although only one affective variable varied as a function of condition, children 
exhibited differences in several behaviors depending on whether they had or had not been 
told that the toy might be broken. Results of the responsibility condition indicated a main 
effect for latency to repair, F (1, 55) = 5.22, p < .05, eta2 = .094, with children showing 
longer latencies to repair in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition (Ms = 11.70 and 2.94 sec, respectively). There was an additional 
condition main effect for self-comfort, F (1, 55) = 4.05, p < .05, eta2 = .069, with children 
showing more self-comforting behaviors in the personal responsibility than in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = 0.40 and -0.55, respectively). Finally, there 
was a trend for asking to leavelleaving, with children in the personal responsibility 
condition more often trying to leave the room than in the ambiguous responsibility 
condition (Ms = 0.40 and 0.19, respectively), F (1, 55) = 3.14, p < .09, eta2 = .054. 
Overall, these findings indicate that the responsibility manipulation was successful, but 
may not have had the effects that were originally intended given the relationship found 
between shame-relevant behaviors and the personal responsibility condition. 
Experimenter Returns 
Children expressed less mild fear in the personal responsibility than in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.19 and 0.29 respectively), F (1, 55) = 7.95, p 
< .O1, eta2 = .126. In addition, there was a trend for expressions of full joy to have a 
larger decrease from baseline in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.23 and 0.09 respectively), F (1, 55) = 2.87, p < .lo, eta2 
= .050. All other emotion variables were non significant. 
Analyses of behavioral measures revealed no significant differences in behaviors 
as a function of condition. There was a trend for children to display more self-comfort in 
the personal responsibility than the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 0.60 and - 
0.39, respectively), F (l,55) = 3.82, p < .06, eta2 = .065. Chi-square analyses of nominal 
behavioral data revealed that children in the personal and ambiguous responsibility 
conditions did not differ in whether they commented about the broken toy before or after 
being prompted, x2 (1) = 2.08, n.s.; deniedminimized before being prompted, or after 
being prompted x2 (1) = 0.14, and 0.02 respectively, n.s.; confessed before or after being 
prompted x2 (1) = 0.18, and 0.13 respectively, n.s.; or in their overall emotion x2 (1) = 
0.14, n.s. Avoidant and Nonavoidant responding did differ as a function of condition, 
with chlldren more often being classified as avoidant than nonavoidant in the personal 
responsibility condition, x2 (I) = 3.85, p = .05 (See Table 9). These findings were 
contrary to expectations, but are consistent with the overall emotion and behavioral 
findings when the child was alone. 
Hypothesis 3: Age and Responsibility 
With respect to developmental trends within conditions, the following interactions 
were hypothesized: a) 3- and 4-year-old children would display more guilt in the personal 
responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, b) 4-year-olds 
would display more guilt in the personal responsibility condition than would 2- or 3-year- 
old children, c) 2-year-old children would not differ in the amount of guilt and shame 
displayed in personal and ambiguous responsibility conditions, and d) 2-year-old children 
would show more shame in the personal responsibility condition than would 3- or 4-year- 
old children. 
An additional MANOVA was conducted with behavioral categories (e.g., latency to 
repair toy) as the dependent variables to determine if age groups differed in the overall 
use of avoidance or reparation behaviors. Planned comparisons were conducted to 
determine if 1) older children use more reparation behaviors (repair and comment) in the 
personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, and 2) 
younger children use more avoidance behaviors (gaze aversion, toy avoidance, and 
experimenter avoidance) in the personal responsibility condition than older preschoolers 
use. 
Table 9 
Number of Children Classified as Avoidant and Nonavoidant as a Function of Condition 







An age by responsibility interaction was found such that blends of joy and 
tensiodworry, F (2, 55) = 3.34, p < .05, eta2 = .108, varied as a function of group, with 4- 
year-olds expressing fewer blends of joy and tensiodworry in the personal responsibility 
than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.19 and 0.42 respectively), F (1, 
59) = 6.94, p < .05, eta2 = .105. Although no other age by condition interactions were 
significant in the overall MANOVA, M h e r  analyses of predicted relationships were 
examined. 
Examination of emotion variables revealed no significant simple main effects, 
although several emotions did approach significance. Among 2-year-olds, there was a 
trend for children to have a larger decrease, from baseline, in expressions of full joy in the 
personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.17 and 
0.44 respectively), F (1, 59) = 2.98, p < .lo, eta2 = .048. Among 3-year-olds, there was a 
trend for expressing less full anger in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.02 and 0.19 respectively), F (1, 59) = 2.90, p < .lo, eta2 
= .047. In addition, there was a trend for 3-year-olds to express fewer blends of fear and 
sadness in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms 
= -0.2 1 and 0.02 respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.1 1, p < .09, eta2 = .050. 
Examination of behavioral variables revealed a condition by age interaction for 
latency to repair, F (2, 55) = 3.46, p < .05, eta2 = .112. Follow up analyses indicated that 
for 2-year-olds, latency to repair was longer in the personal responsibility than the 
ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 26.4 and 4.1 sec, respectively), F (1, 59) = 
11.15, p < .001, eta2 = .159, but did not differ for 3-year-olds, F (1,59) = 0.28, n.s., eta2 = 
.005, or 4-year-olds, F (1, 59) = .005, n.s., eta2 = .000 (See Table 10). Exploratory 
analyses conducted on children's affection towards the toy revealed a condition by age 
interaction for affection, F (2, 55) = 4.23, p < .09, eta2 = .133. In particular, less affection 
was shown by 3-year-olds in the personal responsibility than the ambiguous responsibility 
condition, (Ms = 0.10 and 0.73, respectively), F (1, 59) = 6.48, p < .05, eta2 = .099, but 
affection did not differ for 2- and 4-year-olds by responsibility condition. 
Although the overall condition by age interaction for self-comfort was not 
significant, for 2-year-olds, self comfort was more frequent in the personal responsibility 
than the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 1.3 and -0.60, respectively), F (1, 59) 
= 5.42, p < .05, eta2 = .084). In addition, 4-year-olds exhibited a trend to attempt to leave 
the room more often in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility 
condition (Ms = 0.30 and 0.20, respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.97, p < .06, eta2 = .063). 
Experimenter Returns 
Analyses of age by condition conducted on emotion variables revealed no significant 
interactions. Follow up analyses within age groups revealed that there was a trend for 2- 
year-olds to express less mild fear in the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition (Ms = -0.25 and 0.29 respectively), F (1, 59) = 3.22, p < .08, eta2 
= .052. Among 3-year-olds, less mild fear was expressed in the personal responsibility 
than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = 0.02 and 0.56 respectively), F (1, 
59) = 6.53, p < .05, eta2 = .10 (See Figure 6). 
Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Latency to Repair in Seconds 
Factor Mean SD 
Personal Responsibility 
2-year-olds 26.40 32.83 
3-year-olds 5.60 11.75 
4-year-olds 3.10 2.89 
Ambiguous Responsibility 
2-year-olds 4.10 3.41 
3-year-olds 2.18 1.60 
4-year-olds 2.60 1.78 
Entire Sample 7.25 16.15 
Figure 6 
Expressions of Mild Fear when the Experimenter Returned as a Function of Age and 
Condition 
I -t- Ambiguous 1 
Only blends of tensionlwony with joy were significant among 4-year-olds, with 
fewer blends of tensionlwony and joy expressed in the personal responsibility condition 
than in the ambiguous responsibility condition (Ms = -0.23 and 0.38 respectively), F (1, 
59) = 5.07, p < .05, eta2 = .079. Analyses of behavioral data revealed a trend for 2-year- 
olds to display more self-comfort, (Ms = 1.40 and -0.30, respectively), F (1,59) = 3.76, p 
< .06, eta2 = .060, and more gaze aversion, (Ms = .67 and .02 sec, respectively), F ( I ,  59) 
= 3.78, p < .06, eta2 = .060, in the personal responsibility than the ambiguous 
responsibility condition. In addition, 3-year-olds displayed less affection with the toy in 
the personal responsibility than in the ambiguous responsibility condition, (Ms = 0.00 and 
0.55 respectively), F (1, 59) = 4.79, p < .05, eta2 = .075. There was no significant 
difference between personal responsibility and ambiguous responsibility groups for 4- 
year-olds on any behavioral variables. 
Individual Differences 
Preliminary Analyses of Dichotomy 
In order to determine if the avoidant and nonavoidant dichotomy reflected the 
variability found in affective and behavioral measures, the following preliminary analyses 
were conducted on these two groups. A discriminant function analysis @FA) was 
performed to detennine which variables significantly contribute to the discrimination of 
avoidant and nonavoidant responding. One of the purposes of the DFA is to aid in the 
interpretation of how groups differ, but the variables included must meet several 
assumptions, such as being measured at the interval or ratio level and not being a linear 
combination of other variables (Klecka, 1982). As such, several emotion and behavioral 
variables (i.e., confession before or after prompt, denylminimize before or after prompt, 
aggression to the toy, overall emotional expressions, and overall emotion regulation) were 
excluded from the analysis, as well as subject characteristics such as gender. 
The eigenvalue, 6.77, and canonical correlation, .93, suggest that the h c t i o n  is 
substantively meaningful in discriminating group membership. In addition, Wilks' 
lambda indicated that the function does discriminate group membership, 12 = . 1 2 9 , 2  (43) 
= 76.90, p <.001. Table 11 shows the standardized canonical coefficients for variables 
that made sizable contributions to the DFA. Several emotion variables made sizable 
contributions to the DFA, particularly joy and tensiodwony. As expected, amending and 
avoiding behaviors not used to create these grouping, such as affection and self-comfort, 
also contributed to the discrimination of groups. The absolute values of these 
standardized coefficients were greater than 0.95. In addition, toy avoidance was 
moderately important to the discrimination of groups (w = -0.825). If shame is a 
precursor to guilt, then age should be a significant discriminator, and was therefore 
included in the DFA, but the standardized coefficient did not contribute to the 
discrimination of the avoidant and nonavoidant groups (w = -0.220). 
Hypothesis 4: Gender and GuiltfShame-Prone Responding 
With regards to gender, it was hypothesized that boys would be more likely than 
girls to be classified as guilt-prone, and that girls would be more likely to be classified as 
shame-prone than boys. Given the inconsistency of gender findings in the literature, these 
hypotheses were exploratory. Results revealed that boys and girls did not differ in 
avoidant and nonavoidant classification, x2 (1) = .40, p = .53. 
Table 11 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients for Variables Discriminating Avoidant and 
Nonavoidant Groupings 
- 
Variable Standardized Coefficients 
Alone 
Mild Joy -1.636 
Full Joy -2.594 
Mild Sadness -1.548 
Full Sadness 1.950 
Full TensiodWorry 1 .O39 
TensiodWorry 
Sadness Blend 1.131 
Experimenter Returns 
Mild Joy 2.546 
Full Joy 2.744 
Mild TensiodWorry 1.093 
TensiodWorry 
Fear Blend -1.270 
TensiodWorry 
Joy Blend 1.104 
Affection 0.984 
Self Comfort 0.907 
Hypothesis 5 : Prediction of GuiltlShame-Prone Responding 
Differences in affective expressions in avoidant and nonavoidant children were 
examined through independent samples f-tests. Expressions of joy were the only emotion 
variable to vary as a function of nonavoidant and avoidant classification. As predicted, 
nonavoidant children showed a greater decrease in mild joy than did avoidant children 
when alone (Ms = -0.42 and 0.3 1 respectively), f (59) = -3.08, p < .01, and when the 
experimenter returned (Ms = -0.46 and 0.35 respectively), f (59) = -3.08, p < .01. In 
addition, there was a trend for avoidant children to express more fear and tensiodworry 
than nonavoidant children when the experimenter returned (Ms = 0.14 and -0.08 
respectively), t (59) = -1.78, p < .08, although this failed to reach significance. 
Behavioral differences in avoidant and nonavoidant responding were more 
apparent than were affective differences. Nonavoidant children were consistently higher 
in reparations and lower in avoidance behaviors than were avoidant children. As shown 
in Figure 7, nonavoidant children had shorter latencies to repair (Ms = 2.6 sec and 10.7 
respectively), f (59) = -2.01, p < .05 than did avoidant children. Nonavoidant children 
less often asked to leave or tried to leave than did avoidant children (Ms = 4.62 and 
22.29 respectively), f (59) = -2.33, p < .05 (See Figure 8). There was also a trend for 
nonavoidant children to have shorter latencies to gaze at the experimenter (Ms = 1.5 and 
3.7 sec respectively), f (59) = -1.89, p < .07, although this failed to reach significance. 
Figure 7 
Latency to Repair among Nonavoidant and Avoidant Children 
Nonavoidant Avoidant 
Figure 8 
Rate of Asking to Leave or Leaving among Nonavoidant and Avoidant Children when 
the Experimenter Returned 
Nonavoidant Avoidant 
Finally, an examination of differences in global social and emotional 
characteristics as a function of avoidant and nonavoidant classification was assessed with 
independent samples 1-tests. SCBE scales and summary scores and My Child scales 
served as the dependent variables. It was hypothesized that guilt-prone children would be 
higher in social competence, but lower in internalizing and externalizing behaviors than 
shame-prone children. 
As hypothesized, nonavoidant children were rated by teachers as higher in social 
competence than were avoidant children (Ms = 13 1.7 and 114.9), f(59) = 2.26, p < .05. 
Given that age and social competence are consistently related in previous studies, and in 
the present study (1 = .28, p < .05), it is possible that the relationship between social 
competence and avoidantlnonavoidant responding was an artifact of the covariance of 
age. Therefore, group differences in social competence were examined with the effects of 
age partialled out. The corrected model again reached significance, F (2,58) = 3.578, p < 
.05, indicating that social competence does make a unique contribution to nonavoidant 
and avoidant responding beyond its relationship with age. Hypotheses regarding 
individual scales were partially supported, with nonavoidant chldren displaying more 
positive social and emotional hnctioning than avoidant children. Nonavoidant children 
were rated by teachers as more tolerant (Ms = 35.9 and 30.5, respectively), t(59) = 2.20, 
p < .05, prosocial, (Ms = 35.4 and 30.1, respectively), t (59) = 2.86, p < .0l, cooperative 
(Ms = 40.2 and 34.5 respectively), t (59) = 3.07, p < .01, and as exhibiting fewer 
externalizing behaviors (Ms = 84.9 and 74.9 respectively), (59) = 2.50, p < .05. In 
addition, there was a trend for nonavoidant children to be rated by teachers as more calm 
than avoidant children (Ms = 35.8 and 32.0, respectively), f (59) = 1.86, p < .07. 
With regard to My Child, it was hypothesized that 1) confession, apology, 
reparation, empathy, internalized conduct, and concern over others' transgressions would 
be higher in guilt-prone than shame-prone children, and 2) affective discomfort after 
wrongdoing and concern over good feelings with parent, will be higher in shame-prone 
than guilt-prone children. Nonavoidant children did not differ fiom avoidant children in 
confession or internalized conduct, but were rated by parents as higher in apology andlor 
promise not do it again (Ms = 28.3 and 24.5 respectively), t (59) = 2.04, p < .05, 
reparatiodamends (Ms = 42.7 and 39.8 respectively), t (59) = 1.8, p < .08, 
empathic/prosocial response to another's distress (Ms = 69.9 and 62.0 respectively), t (59) 
= 3.52, p = .001, and active moral regulatiodvigilance (Ms = 180.5 and 165.0 
respectively), t (59) = 2.29, p < .05. Contrary to expectations, nonavoidant children were 
higher than avoidant children in affective discomfort after wrongdoing (Ms = 210.6 and 
194.2 respectively), t (59) = 2.30, p < .05, suggesting that this factor represents affective 
discomfort as noticed by the parent rather than the child. In addition, although not 
hypothesized, nonavoidant children were rated by their parents as higher than avoidant 
children in corrections occasioned by others' transgressions (Ms = 34.6 and 30.7 
respectively), t (59) = 2.32, p < .05. 
No particular hypothesis was stated in regard to either of the following scales: 
"symbolic reproduction of7dealing with wrongdoing" and "sensitivity to flawed or 
damaged objects, themes of wrongdoing", nor did nonavoidant and avoidant children 
differ on any these scales. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Recent research has begun to explore the affective expressions and behavioral 
responses that are particular to mild guilt and shame in children in laboratory conditions 
(e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole et al., 1992; Lewis, 1991; Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al., 
1992). In addition, it is important to determine if any other individual differences exist 
between children prone to the expression of one emotion rather than the other. To date, 
few studies have examined the development of the capacity to express guilt and shame in 
young children, and it is currently not clear how these emotions are expressed in 
preschool children. The present study examined expressions of guilt and shame in 
response to a laboratory mishap paradigm to investigate age changes and the effects of 
context (i.e., personal responsibility vs. ambiguous responsibility) on children's affective 
and behavioral responses. 
In light of the present study as well as others (e.g., Barrett, et al., 1993; Cole et al., 
1992) several questions remain with regard to what expressive components of guilt are 
convincingly present at this age. Shame may be characterized by anxiety and tension 
coupled with avoidant behaviors. However, the lack of avoidance may be necessary, but 
not sufficient to infer the presence of guilt. Theorists generally agree that the presence of 
guilt is marked not only by the absence of avoidance, but also by the presence of 
reparations and confession, as well as affective discomfort (e.g., Ferguson & Stegge, 
1998; Lewis, 1993; Sroufe, 1995; Tangney, 1998). To date, research investigating young 
children's expressions in response to mishap paradigms has failed to define children as 
guilt-prone based on both avoidance and reparation measures (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993). 
However, preschool aged children and toddlers who are low in avoidance do display 
affective and behavioral reactions that are consistent with guilt. Alternatively, if full- 
fledged guilt is not present in preschool children, then it may be more useful to determine 
what affective expressions and behavioral tendencies are present in terms of 
developmental precursors. These nascent abilities may reflect the emergence of the 
capacity for guilt during the preschool years, but do not define guilt. 
In general, results of the present revealed that younger preschoolers do express 
more shame-relevant emotions (e.g., tensiodworry) and behaviors (e.g., experimenter 
avoidance) than did older preschoolers. In contrast, older preschoolers expressed guilt- 
relevant emotions such as sadness, but blended with tensiodworry, and guilt-relevant 
behaviors such as shorter latencies to attempt to repair the broken toy. However, an 
examination of guilt- and shame-prone responding was not possible in the present study, 
as children were dichotomized only by avoidance measures but not also with the more 
inclusive definition of reparation and confession. Children low in avoidance also 
displayed more reparation and scored higher on parental-reports of guilt-relevant 
behaviors, suggesting that these children may be prone to expressing guilt. Moreover, 




As hypothesized, tensiodworry did decrease with age, but the difference was 
primarily between 2- and 3-year-olds. Interestingly, no other emotion variables were 
significant. This was surprising given that guilt and shame are linked to emotional 
expressions (Cole et al., 1992, Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al., 1992). However, the effect 
size for tensionlworry was fairly strong, suggesting that insight into the expression of this 
emotion may be key to understanding developmental differences in shame and guilt. 
Additionally, tensionlworry blended with sadness increased with age, again with the 
primary difference being between 2- and 3-year-olds. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that 2-year-olds did not blend tensionlworry with sadness when the experimenter 
was present, but older preschoolers did. These findings are consistent with theories of the 
adaptive function of emotional expressions (e.g., Campos & Barrett, 1984; Izard, 1993), 
which state that sadness has a social and expressive function that tensionlworry does not. 
As Izard notes, sadness entails a "deeper reflection on a disappointing performance or a 
failure" but also arouses empathy and assistance from others (1993, p. 634). In particular, 
sadness in this context signals that a child needs assistance in repairing the toy and or the 
relationship, which is consistent with the finding that thls emotion (although blended) 
was more prevalent in older preschoolers, who were also less likely to be classified as 
avoidant. It is likely that younger preschoolers who exhibited a general pattern of 
avoidance were not as outwardly concerned with repair and therefore did not express 
sadness. Given that tensionlworry decreased with age, and was related to avoidance, and 
sadness blended with tensionlwony increased with age but was not related to avoidance, 
these blended emotional expressions typical of older preschoolers likely reflect more 
sadness than tensionlworry. However, the sadness expressed was not isolated from other 
expressions. Given the novelty of the testing situation, and the possibility of punishment, 
these added expressions might have reflected some degree of anxiety about the outcon~e 
of the mishap. Additionally, these mixed expressions may be reflective of developmental 
precursors to older children and adults' guilt expressions and experiences, and may signal 
the preschool child's transition from shame-prone to guilt-prone responding. 
Behavioral Reactions 
Although it was hypothesized that younger children would show more frequent 
avoidant behaviors, 2-, 3- and 4-year olds did not differ in self-comfort, toy avoidance, 
affection or aggression towards the toy, or in attempts to leave the room when initially 
left alone. These findings were surprising given that avoidance is consistently found to 
relate to shame in failure tasks (e.g., Lewis et al., 1992) and mishap paradigms (Barrett et 
al., 1993; Cole et al., 1992). However, younger children did differ in their initial reaction 
to the broken toy, as 2-year-olds had longer latencies to attempt to repair the toy than did 
4-year-olds. Latency to repair failed to differ significantly between 3-year-olds and either 
2- or 4-year olds. This was probably due to the relatively small sample size, as the 
developmental difference approached significance, and the effect size was quite large. 
This is consistent with previous research that found latencies to repair, as well as 
latencies to comment about the mishap, are shorter in amending children (Barrett et al., 
1993). 
Several behavioral differences did emerge when the experimenter was present 
though, suggesting that the reactions to the mishap were intensified by the presence of the 
person who was affected. Again, behavioral differences existed primarily between 2- 
year-olds and older preschoolers, with 2-year-olds showing more avoidance. In particular, 
2-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to avoid the toy by turning their bodies 
away from it or by pushing the toy away from them. These findings should be interpreted 
with caution, as a more liberal post hoc test was performed to explore these differences, 
and the effect size was relatively small. Finally, 2-year-olds avoided the experimenter by 
turning their bodies away from the experimenter more frequently than 4-year-olds. Given 
the moderate effect size for this variable, the lack of significance for other age contrasts 
may also be partly due to sample size. It should be noted that children were often tested 
in small rooms, and no other toys were present, making experimenter avoidance awkward 
for the child, as there was no other activity or person that could be the focus of their 
attention. This adds further support to the need to examine behavior alone and with the 
experimenter present, as the experimenter acted as more than simply an audience 
member. Although many theorists argue that an audience is not required for one to 
experience self-conscious emotions (e.g., Sroufe, 1995; Stipek et al., 1992), these 
emotions may be intensified when one is present, especially in the case of a wrong 
directed at the audience member. Since the mishap was directed at the experimenter, 
these behaviors might differ if the person entering the room after the mishap was not the 
one that was 'wronged', but instead was a child or adult with whom to play. It would be 
interesting to examine the differences in children's reactions to mishaps when someone 
unconnected to the event was present, versus the person who was affected. It is likely 
that in such a situation, the child's emotional and behavioral reactions would decrease, as 
there would be less of a need to avoid the audience member. 
Contrary to expectations, commenting before or after being prompted, denying or 
minimizing the damage, and confession before being prompted by the experimenter did 
not differ as a function of age. This was surprising given that previous research using 
mishap paradigms has found avoidant children to be slower to tell the experimenter when 
a mishap occurred (Barrett et al., 1993). Although the definition of confession in the 
present study was consistent with telling or commenting about the broken toy, the lack of 
findings may be related to the absence of the parent during testing. In Barrett and 
colleagues' mishap paradigm (1993), the parent remained with the child in the testing 
room even though the experimenter had left. In contrast, children in the present study 
were alone when the toy broke, perhaps allowing them to think that no one knew that the 
toy had been broken or that they were responsible. It should be noted that only 5 of the 
6 1 children confessed before the experimenter prompted them. 
Once children were prompted though, it was expected that a majority of children, 
especially older preschoolers, would confess. In essence, prompts acted as a way of 
informing the child that the experimenter knew the toy was damaged, but without placing 
specific blame on the child. Given that the child was the only one present, it would be 
natural to assume that he or she was therefore 'caught'. Still, only 33% of children 
confessed after being prompted. The age differences in this confession failed to reach 
significance, which is not surprising given the low number of children confessing. 
However, given the developmental trend present in these findings, particularly with more 
4 year-olds confessing than either 2- or 3-year-olds, it is possible that older preschoolers 
do confess more after being 'caught', but that the present study lacked the power to detect 
these differences. These findings are consistent with empirical evidence of deception 
among preschoolers. When placed with an enticing, but forbidden toy, two-thirds of the 
preschoolers who 'peeked' at the toy then lied or did not respond when asked if they had 
'peeked' (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989). In addition, these nonconfessors do not 
differ from confessors in emotional or behavioral reactions to the experimenter's probe. 
In contrast, when probed for information in another context, such as trying to hide a toy 
from the experimenter, 3-year-olds do attempt to deceive the experimenter, but often leak 
information, and are therefore unsuccesshl (LaFreniere, 1988; see also Chandler, Fritz, & 
Hala, 1989). Taken together, these findings suggest that younger preschool children may 
attempt to deceive others, but lack the cognitive sophistication to hlly understand the 
other person's thoughts and perceptions. 
The awareness of another's knowledge base, such as is necessary in deception, is 
one of the fundamental cognitive components of the preschooler's emerging theory of 
mind. Given that guilt and shame are particularly cognitive emotions, it is not surprising 
that many of the developmental patterns found in the present study parallel the age 
changes in the development of theory of mind. In addition to deception, preschool 
children are increasingly capable of belief-desire reasoning, and of understanding the 
appearance-reality distinction (see Flavell, 2000, for a review). Although researchers have 
consistently found that children do not pass false-belief tasks (Wimrner & Pemer, 1983) 
or appearance-reality tasks (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986) until they are about 4-years- 
old, several studies have challenged these findings as relying on too narrow a definition 
for these abilities. For example, children as young as 3-years-old are capable of knowing 
that emotions depend on desires and beliefs (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991), and that 
appearance and reality do not always match in everyday objects (Wooley & Wellman, 
1990). It is not surprising then, that many of the emotional and behavioral differences 
found in children's reactions to the mishap paradigm were between 2-year-olds and older 
preschoolers. 
Finally, as only 33% confessed, using the classification of guilt- and shame-prone, 
as originally designed revealed that only 7 children were guilt-prone (i.e., high in 
confession and low in avoidance). As mentioned above, confession was relatively 
uncomnlon for preschoolers; therefore only measures of avoidance were used to create 
the avoidant and nonavoidant classification in the present study. As such, 26 children 
were nonavoidant and 35 avoidant. As hypothesized, classification as avoidant or 
nonavoidant did vary as a function of age. This finding is lends support to Sroufe's 
(1995) tenet that guilt develops during the preschool years from a more global emotional 
reaction reflected in shame. In addition, the dichotomy of children into avoidant and 
nonavoidant groups reflects previous research that has found, using a similar 
classification strategy, that amending toddlers do exhibit many emotional and behavioral 
responses consistent with the experience of guilt (Barrett et al., 1993). Alternatively, 
given that guilt could not be directly addressed with this classification system, preschool 
children may not be capable of experiencing full-fledged guilt. Nonavoidant responding 
may simply reflect a mixed emotional response that indicates a transition from shame, as 
seen in younger preschoolers, to guilt, which may be fully formed later in development. 
Given the mixed developmental findings with respect to changes from 2- to 3- and 2- to 
4-years-old, guilt and shame may exist along a single dimension, creating the possibility 
that there are actually 3 groups (e.g., guilt-prone, shame-prone, and mixed). The mixed 
emotional and behavioral responses seen in preschool children suggest that guilt may not 
develop during the preschool years. Rather, these findings suggest that nascent forms of 
guilt are beginning to emerge during this developmental period. Additionally, these age 
effects might not reflect a developmental sequence from global shame to specific guilt 
since the study was cross sectional in nature. Future studies could investigate the 
developmental progression of these emotions longitudinally. 
Situation and Affect 
Verbal directions to the participants were designed to elicit or reduce feelings of 
personal responsibility in children. If children are told that the toy is already broken, for 
example, it is likely that they will not feel personally responsible if the toy does in fact 
break. Conversely, if they are given no information about the toy being broken, than they 
should be more likely to blame themselves or see themselves as personally responsible 
for breaking the toy. Given that guilt is theoretically linked to feelings of personal 
responsibility (Lewis, 1993; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 1 986), it was expected 
that children would display more guilt relevant reactions in this situation. Contrary to 
expectations, children in the personal responsibility condition showed a pattern of 
behavioral reactions such as greater avoidance and less reparation, which is typically 
associated with shame, not guilt (e.g., Lewis, 1993). It is possible that although personal 
responsibility is one of the constructs that differentiates guilt from other emotions, 
individual differences rather than context will elicit these feelings. Alternatively, as 
research with hypothetical situations and interviews suggests (e.g., Graybill, 1993; Stipek 
& DeCostis, 1988; Weiner & Graham, 1989) awareness of personal responsibility as a 
factor in guilt may not emerge during this developmental period. 
Affective Expressions 
Findings in the present study did not support the hypothesis that children's 
affective expressions would differ as a function of the degree of personal responsibility. 
When the child was alone, only full joy was seen to decrease from baseline more in the 
personal responsibility condition than in the ambiguous responsibility condition. In 
addition, children expressed more mild fear in the ambiguous responsibility condition 
than in the personal responsibility condition when the experimenter was present. This was 
surprising given that fear is hypothesized to signal knowledge of impending danger 
(Darwin, 187211965; Izard, 1993). It may be that children expressed mild fear when the 
experimenter returned because of the possibility of punishment. In addition, the finding 
that these expressions occurred more often in the ambiguous responsibility condition as 
opposed to the personal responsibility condition suggests that children were more fearful 
about the encounter with the experimenter when they had already been warned that the 
toy was broken and to be careful with it, but played with it and broke it anyway. This is 
consistent with research that demonstrates that early elementary school age children 
attribute shame or pride to story characters only when a parent is present (Harter & 
Whitesell, 1989). As Stipek (1995) notes, self-conscious emotions emerge after a child 
internalizes rules and standards, so that emotional reactions are no longer dependent on 
the evaluation of others. In the present study, children's emotional reactions when alone 
likely reflected a self-conscious evaluation, but these emotional reactions may have been 
intensified or altered with the presence of an audience member. Finally, early elementary 
age children mention that guilt is more likely or will increase, but that shame will 
decrease if a parent were present (Berti et al., 2000). However, the shame situations 
frequently reflected embarrassment, making the role of an audience member unclear in 
the easement or intensification of these emotions. 
Behavioral Reactions 
When children were initially alone after the toy broke, children in the personal 
responsibility condition had longer latencies to repair and displayed more self-comforting 
behavior such as biting their lips or playing with their hair. In contrast, children in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition were quicker to repair the toy than those in the 
personal responsibility condition since they were primed for this event to occur. This may 
reflect differences in the speed of processing a novel or unexpected event when compared 
to an event that was expected. Although not significant, the trend for children in the 
personal responsibility condition to try to leave the room more frequently is consistent 
with the general pattern of avoidant behavior. Alternatively, they may have been 
attempting to get help from the experimenter, as they had not expected the toy would 
break. The reason the child left the room was not assessed in this study, but given the 
low frequency of its occurrence, it is unlikely that analyses of these reasons would be 
meaningful in the present study. 
Overall, this pattern suggests that chlldren in the personal responsibility condition 
might have been experiencing shame rather than guilt as it was designed to do. The 
apparent paradox may be explained by the fact that children in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition had been warned by the experimenter that not only was the toy 
'her favorite' but also that they should be careful, since it was already broken. Given the 
lack of consistent avoidant or nonavoidant responses as a function of condition, it is not 
surprising that the avoidant and nonavoidant classification was not related to this 
manipulation. Taken together, these findings suggest that the verbal instructions, although 
somewhat important, were not powerful enough to elicit an increase in feelings of guilt. 
In addition, the verbal instructions in some ways created patterns that were opposed to 
those hypothesized. As such, it was not easy to induce feelings of personal responsibility 
in the present study. As Saarni (1999) notes, the cognitive egocentrism of preschool 
children may make them more likely to think that they are responsible for events which 
they actually have little or no control over. In the present study, it is reasonable to assume 
that children felt responsible for breaking the toy regardless of whether the toy was 
already broken or not, but these feelings of responsibility did not induce guilt, but rather 
shame. 
Age and Situation 
Affective Expressions 
When comparing the responsibility conditions within each age group, a more 
consistent pattern of affective expressions emerged. Specifically, within each age group, 
several negative emotions were more frequently expressed in the ambiguous 
responsibility condition than in the personal responsibility condition. For instance, when 
children were alone, 3-year-olds expressed more full anger and blends of fear with 
sadness in the anlbiguous than the personal responsibility condition. When the 
experimenter was present, both 2- and 3-year-olds expressed mild fear displays 
suggesting that they were afraid of being punished. 
When initially alone, and when the experimenter returned, 4-year-olds expressed 
more joy blended with tension/wony when they had been told that the toy might be 
broken than when they were not warned that the toy was broken. It is likely that the 
blending of these emotions is not a sign of ambivalent positive and negative feelings, but 
rather a nervous smile that was meant to ease the situation. Although expressions of 
embarrassment were not examined, it is possible that these anxious smiles reflected this 
emotion. Consistent with this interpretation, Barrett and colleagues (1993) found that 
children high in avoidance display more smiles followed by gaze aversion. These findings 
are in contrast to the present study, but may reflect the differences in the children's ages 
(i.e., toddlers versus preschoolers) or the fact that there was a longer delay before the 
experimenter prompted the child in Barrett and colleagues' study. As such, the shorter 
time between the experimenter's return and the experimenter's prompts may have masked 
some individual differences that would reflect an avoider's discomfort with the situation. 
Behavioral Reactions 
As with affective expressions, findings regarding behavioral reactions were in an 
unexpected direction. Interestingly, latency to repair appeared to be the most important 
variable examined in the present study, as it consistently differentiated age groups, and 
responsibility conditions, as well as the interaction of these variables, and was important 
in differentiating guilt and shame reactions in previous studies (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993). 
In particular, 2-year-olds took much longer to attempt to repair the toy when they had not 
been told it was broken. This finding has several implications. First, it suggests that the 
age effect for latency to repair, whereby 2-year-olds were slower to repair, is not likely 
due to psychomotor differences. When examining responses to the responsibility 
conditions within this age group, 2-year-olds attempted to repair the toy as quickly as 
older preschoolers when they had been warned that the toy was broken. It was when they 
were not primed for this event that they appeared much slower than their older peers. It is 
likely that latency to repair reflects cognitive and experiential differences, as well as 
emotional ones. Future studies could explore the significance of latency to repair, as this 
variable has begun to emerge as an important individual response to mishap situations, 
yet it remains unclear whether the behavior relates to cognitive processing differences or 
emotional coping styles, or both. 
Finally, 3-year-olds continued to display more affection towards the toy in the 
ambiguous responsibility condition when the experimenter was present. Although 2-year- 
olds showed a trend for displaying more self-comfort and more gaze aversion in the 
personal responsibility condition, these behaviors failed to differ with respect to the 
responsibility conditions. It is likely that the present study lacked the power to detect 
these differences, possibly due to sample size. On the other hand, given the inconsistent 
and somewhat weak effects of the responsibility condition generally, the present study 
may have lacked power in the manipulation of the verbal instructions. Future research 




Examination of the dichotomy revealed that the classification of children as 
avoidant or nonavoidant was theoretically meaningful, whether or not it reflects guilt and 
shame-prone responding. This is consistent with previous research that has found shame- 
prone children to be higher in avoidance and tensionlwony (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole 
et al., 1992; Lewis, 1992) and guilt prone children to be higher in sadness and have 
shorter latencies to repair and point out the mishap (e.g., Barrett et al., 1993; Cole et al., 
1992). However, an examination of the variables that contributed to this dichotomy 
should be interpreted with caution. Since the subject to variable ratio of the DFA was 
quite small, too many variables may have been included as "some variables will likely be 
included which do not contribute to the separation of groups.. .[and] a different subset 
would emerge from the repetition of the study" (Rancher & Larson, 1980, p. 350, as cited 
in Stevens, 1996, p. 272). This is consistent with the fact that, although age was related to 
avoidant and nonavoidant classification, it did not weigh heavily in the discrimination of 
groups. As such, generalization of these findings as a true indicator of the variables that 
discriminate between avoidant and nonavoidant responding, and particularly as 
discriminators of guilt from shame, seems unwarranted. On the other hand, emotion 
variables, particularly joy blended with tensiodwony, discriminated between these 
groups, as did affection and self-comfort. The results of the DFA can therefore be useful 
in directing the design of future studies to limit the number of variables examined and to 
increase the sample size, so that a more stable DFA can be examined. In addition, the 
present study was unable to analyze the importance of behaviors related to reparation 
such as confession or minimizing the mishap. Given the importance of these variables in 
the theoretical differentiation of guilt and shame, future research could examine how 
reparations aid in the discrimination of these emotions among preschoolers. 
In addition, the discriminant function analysis assumes that the groups being 
examined are mutually exclusive categories. Although guilt and shame are conceptualized 
as mutually exclusive, it is possible that guilt- and shame-prone responding to a single 
mishap incident has some degree of overlap. For instance, whereas tensiodwony reflects 
shame-prone responding, the expression of this emotion is not precluded fiom children 
classified as nonavoidant. In addition, tensiodwony decreased with age, but sad and 
tensiodwony blends increased with age, further suggesting that these may not be 
mutually exclusive in terms of emotional expressions. It is likely that, although the 
groups are theoretically distinct, their expressive components have considerable overlap. 
Alternatively, the fundamental significance of the dichotomy is not without value, as the 
variables did separate the groups in theoretically meaningful ways. As Klecka (1982) 
notes "if the groups are not very different in the variables being analyzed, then all of the 
correlations will be low, because we cannot create discrimination when none already 
exists" (pp. 37-38). As such, the specific variables that discriminate may be unstable, but 
the dichotomy itself is likely to be meaningful. 
Gender Differences 
Findings in the present study did not support the notion that avoidant and 
nonavoidant responding varied as a h c t i o n  of gender. This was not surprising given the 
inconsistency of gender findings in the literature, especially in young children (see Bybee, 
1999 for a review). Recent studies using semi-structured interviews and hypothetical 
situations revealed few or no gender differences in young children's understanding of the 
antecedents, consequences, or action tendencies (e.g., Berti et al., 2000; Olthof et al., 
2000), or in the likelihood of being classified as guilt- or shame-prone (Ferguson, Stegge, 
Eye,  Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000). Additionally, the limitations of the present study's 
avoidant classification system do not fully reflect the overall constructs of guilt and 
shame. As such, gender findings should be interpreted with caution. 
Affective and Behavioral Differences 
Hypotheses regarding the emotional and behavioral differences in avoidant and 
nonavoidant children were partially supported in the present study. Only joy differed for 
avoidant and nonavoidant children, with nonavoidant children showing a greater decrease 
in mild joy both when alone and when the experimenter was present. Although the 
present study may have lacked sufficient power, there was a trend for avoidant children to 
express more fear blended with tensionlwony, specifically when the experimenter 
returned to the room. However, this finding does raise an interesting theoretical issue 
about how researchers can distinguish the separate emotions of shame and fear of 
punishment. The expressive and cognitive differences in attempting to avoid punishment 
versus reducing feelings of shame may have overlapping elements. Darwin (1 87211965) 
noted that fear is often expressed at first as a freezing of the body, "as if instinctively to 
escape observation" (p. 290), and that with shame "there is a strong desire for 
concealment" (p. 320). It is likely that fear of punishment may be associated with self- 
conscious emotions such as shame, as it reflects awareness that one has violated a 
standard. 
Behavioral differences between avoidant and nonavoidant responding reflected 
the affective differences noted above. Nonavoiders had shorter latencies to repair, as was 
expected given that guilt is associated with reparation rather than avoidance. This adds 
fkther support to the identification of nonavoiders as experiencing guilt during the 
mishap paradigm. In addition, avoiders were more likely to try to leave the room, 
suggesting that they were uncomfortable and unable to remain regulated in the face of 
arousal. This is consistent with research that demonstrates that young children frequently 
cite reparation has a method of coping with guilt, and hiding or "doing nice things and 
forgetting or distracting" as methods of coping with shame (Berti et al., 2000). As Barrett 
(1 995) notes, shame may be a method of coping used by children as a means of dealing 
with overarousal in a social situation such that children manage the arousal by directing 
their attention away from the incident or person. In addition, Denham (1 998) notes that 
awareness of one's arousal and how one redirects attention away from that arousal, is 
indicative of emotion regulation. In particular, redirecting attention away from feelings of 
arousal may be adaptive in situations when a child experiences anxiety, but may be 
maladaptive if it damages the social bond. Children who experience shame may be 
unable to modulate their arousal in ways that would repair the damage to the social 
relationship, making it a less adaptive response, especially for older children who would 
be expected to have greater emotion regulation. 
Socioemotional Differences 
Nonavoiders, when compared to avoiders, were rated by their teachers as more 
socially competent overall, even when controlling for age. These findings suggest that 
nonavoidant responding reflects a child's quality of adaptation in the preschool classroom 
such that avoidance is not characteristic of a socially competent preschool child. One 
interpretation of these findings that is consistent with what is known about guilt and 
shame in young children is that shame-prone responding is less adaptive than guilt-prone 
responding, and will reflect differences in social competence. Although results of the 
present study suggest that avoidant classification makes a unique contribution to social 
competence beyond its relationship with age, it remains unclear how to tease apart these 
constructs. For example, perhaps guilt and its expression are aspects of social competence 
such that children who express remorse for wrongdoings are likely to be more positively 
rated by their teachers. This is consistent with research by Holmgren, Eisenberg, and 
Fabes (1998) that has demonstrated that teachers rate children who are high in empathy as 
more socially competent than those who are low in measures of empathy. On the other 
hand, perhaps teachers do not notice the expression of guilt and shame per se, but are 
rating these children more positively due to their overall coping style. Future research 
could examine the relationship between social competence as rated by teachers, and as 
reflected in peer relations, and children's proneness to experiencing shame or guilt. 
In addition to global scales of the SCBE, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders, 
were rated as more tolerant, prosocial, and cooperative. As the SCBE scales reflect both 
positive and negative behaviors, avoiders were therefore rated as more angry, egotistical, 
and oppositional than were nonavoiders. As such, these children were also high in 
externalizing behaviors. Although this was expected, it is surprising that they did not 
differ in internalizing behavior as well. Overall, the avoidant response style would 
suggest an inability to regulate arousal and therefore it is likely that shame-prone children 
have less effective emotional regulation strategies, in some instances through avoiding 
these painful emotions. As Saarni (1999) notes, "what is intriguing about emotionally 
competent coping is that often it entails having to deal with our own feelings," and that by 
dealing with these emotions, we maintain our social connectedness (p. 2 19). Finally, the 
present study lends support to the notion that there is a relationship between shame and 
anger, as has been suggested by both psychoanalytic writers (e.g., Goldberg, 1999) and 
developmental theorists (e.g., Sroufe, 1995, Tangney, et al., 1996). For example shame- 
prone, in comparison to guilt-prone individuals, report more frequent use of maladaptive 
anger management, and often lack empathy (Tangney, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996). 
Concurrent Validity 
Findings in regard to the My Child further support the tenet that the nonavoidant 
and avoidant classifications reflect some of the theoretical differences between guilt and 
shame. Although the My Child was administered as a form of concurrent validity, in that 
this measure has been reported to reflect individual differences in the development of 
conscience, it should be noted that the My Child was not specifically designed to test 
guilt and shame. Results of the present study suggest that a nonavoidant classification 
may reflect an overall proneness to guilt, given that, in comparison to avoidant children, 
their parents rated nonavoidant children as higher in apology/promise not to do it again, 
and reparationslamends. These scales reflect the reparations that are consistently used to 
theoretically differentiate guilt fi-om shame. In addition, these children were rated as 
higher in the summary factor of active moral regulatiodvigilance such that nonavoidant 
children, compared to avoidant children, were rated as more concerned with rules and 
prohibitions. This is consistent with previous research that has found that reactive girls as 
well as impulsive and sensation seeking boys score lower on active moral 
regulatiodvigilance (Kochanska et al., 1994). In contrast, children scoring high on this 
scale are less likely to touch or play with a prohibited object, and instead occupy 
themselves with other activities (Kochanska et al., 1994). This pattern of results suggests 
that shame-prone and avoidant children may have dificulty in resisting temptation, and 
are therefore more likely to be punished or reprimanded by their parents. This adds 
further support to the finding that children who were told the toy might be broken were 
likely to experience shame-relevant reactions, as they may have interpreted their play as a 
forbidden act. In addition, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders, were rated as higher 
in concern over others' wrongdoing. This is consistent with the notion that guilt-prone 
children have internalized rules, and would therefore be more aware of their peers' 
transgressions. 
In addition, nonavoiders, in comparison to avoiders, also scored higher on the 
summary factor of affective discomfort after wrongdoing, as was hypothesized. It is 
likely that avoidant children scored lower on this scale since they are masking their 
arousal following these situations, whereas nonavoiders display these emotions so as to 
repair the relationship with the parent. This factor reflects not only the child's emotional 
response, but also a concern for the emotional response of others and a desire to 
apologize. As such, it may reflect a more empathic response focused on the social 
situation rather than simply a fear of punishment or desire to hide. Interestingly, scales 
within this factor represent guilt, a concern for the parent rather than the damaged object, 
a need to be reassured that the parent still loves them, and empathy with others 
(Kochanska et al., 1994). These scales appear to assess both shame and guilt-like 
behaviors, but may represent the child's focus on the relationship and need for repair 
rather than an inability to confiont the possible damage to the relationship, the latter being 
more indicative of shame. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the present study adds to the growing body of research on the 
importance of the development of guilt and its differentiation fiom shame in preschool 
children, several limitations to the validity and generalizability of the findings are worth 
mentioning. First, the participants of the study were primarily limited to white, middle- 
and working class families. As such, it is unclear if these developmental and individual 
difference findings would generalize to a more diverse population. 
Second, although the results of the present study supports the notion that 
nonavoidant responding is more adaptive emotional and behavioral reaction than avoidant 
responding, adaptation is meant to imply only particular contexts. Specifically, the 
cultural implications of these findings should not be over-extended. It should be noted 
that researchers have begun to explore the role of culture in the development of self- 
conscious emotions (see Wallbott & Scherer, 1998 for a review). Several studies have 
suggested that children's predominant shame or guilt reactions may reflect their 
prevailing collectivistic or individualistic cultural context. In particular, shame is more 
prevalent than guilt in collectivistic cultures, but within the socialization experiences of 
those cultures, shame is likely to be adaptive (Chiang, Barrett, & Nunez, 2000). In 
addition, although shame may have similar expressive components cross-culturally, it 
will likely have different experiential components. For example, parents in collectivistic 
cultures report that a child's misdeed reflects on the parent more than do parents in 
individualistic cultures (Chiang et al., 2000). Since misdeeds in a collectivistic culture 
are reflective of the parent as well as the child, shame experiences may be a more social 
and shared experience between the parent and child, whereas shame is a solitary emotion 
within individualistic cultures, felt only by the child (Saami, 1999). Several studies have 
pointed to the adaptive as well as maladaptive nature of these emotions, but the 
expressive and experiential components that may make these emotions positive or 
negative in various cultures are not well understood (Ferguson et al., 2000; Ferguson, 
Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999). 
Third, age effects in the present study may have been artificially heightened by 
linguistic, cognitive, and expressive language differences between 2-year-olds and older 
. 
preschool children. Behavioral categories were defined with these linguistic differences in 
mind. For example, telling the experimenter was defined not only as verbalizing that the 
arm was broken, but also as deliberately showing the experimenter that the arm was 
broken. In addition, simple utterances such as saying "I broke" were considered to be 
examples of confession. It remains unclear whether these linguistic considerations were 
sufficient enough to allow less verbal children (e.g., 2-year-olds) to be accurately 
classified as nonavoidant, but instead made them likely to be classified as avoidant purely 
based on linguistic differences. Future research could examine verbal ability as a 
potential factor in the classification of guilt and shame. 
Additionally, it should be noted that although behaviors and affect were compared 
to baseline free play, children were not presented with a broken toy during baseline. As 
Kagan (1981) notes, 2-year-olds are fascinated and sometimes distressed by broken or 
tom objects. In the present study, although 2-year-olds expressed more tensiodworry 
than did 3-year-olds, children in each age group expressed some tensiodworry, 
suggesting that these emotional reactions may reflect more than distress over a broken 
object, but distress over having caused the damage. Nevertheless, age differences 
between 2-year-olds and older preschool children in the present study should be 
interpreted taking into account Kagan's work. 
The relevance of the broken toy paradigm for children of this age has face 
validity, and likely internal validity as well, as this is a fairly common experience for 
young children. However, the artifact of breaking a toy belonging to an adult, and in a 
controlled environment, may not accurately reflect natural mishaps. Several controls were 
used to regulate the artifice of the design. For example, children were not tested in an 
unfamiliar laboratory environment, but rather in rooms that were familiar to them in their 
own preschools or day care centers. In addition, children were tested only when the 
experimenter had built rapport with the child. It should be noted that younger children 
seemed to take longer to build rapport. This was expected, as 2-year-olds are less socially 
competent than are older preschoolers (e.g., LaFreniere et al., 1992; Rubin, Bukowski, & 
Parker, 1998; Sroufe, 1995). However, given that amount of time per se was not 
controlled (rather degree of comfort with the experimenter was) it is possible that the age 
effects in the study are due to the confound between age and the amount of time spent 
with the experimenter. Although this point can be argued, the variability within each age 
group in children's ability to build rapport with the experimenter likely counteracts the 
variability between each age group. It is possible that shame-prone children need more 
rapport building time, as they are also less socially competent. In addition, Sullivan 
(2001) found that preschool children express more embarrassment and more pride, but 
not more shame, when tested by a familiar versus an unfamiliar exanliner. Future 
research could continue to explore the role of familiarity with the audience member in the 
expression of these self-conscious emotions. 
In conclusion, the present study supports the notion that shame is a developmental 
precursor to guilt, and that these emotions can further signal individual differences in 
adaptive strategies. To date, many questions about the expression of these emotions 
remain unanswered, as the expression of these emotions is often unclear. As Darwin 
noted, "with social animals, the power of intercommunication between members of the 
same community.. .is of highest importance to them" (1 872/1965, p. 60). It is surprising 
then, that emotions that can mend or damage the social bond, and which refer to our 
actions and inactions in reference to the group, are expressed with such variety, and are so 
poorly understood. It is hoped that the present study can inform researchers about the 
development of guilt and shame, and the potential impact that these emotions have on 
children's socioemotional functioning. 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent Form 
Dear Parents or Guardians, 
As a fifth year graduate student, I am working on a study as part of my doctoral 
dissertation at the University of Maine, and I am looking for parents and children who are 
willing to take part in the study. This study looks at preschool children and how they react 
to everyday events. I will be looking at how children react when a toy breaks, and how 
these reactions change with age. Specifically, I am looking at how preschool children 
become able to express responsibility. I am interested in how these behaviors relate to 
children's behavior in the classroom. 
Your child will be asked to take part in one short session that will last no more 
than 10 minutes. This session will done at your child's school, and will be run by an 
adult that your child knows well. I will tell your child that they can end the session at any 
time and for any reason. Your child will be shown a small broken toy and will be told it 
belongs to the researcher. This part of the study will be videotaped so that we can 
identify how your child responds to the broken toy. The child may not be told that the toy 
is broken, but will find out when he or she plays with it, so it is important that you do not 
mention this to your child. Your child may think that helshe broke the toy. I assume that 
some children may feel mild guilt if they think that they have broken the toy, but it should 
be like everyday mishaps that children experience. At the end of this session, I will 
reassure your child that the toy was already broken, and is easily fixed. I will also give 
your child a small prize (such as stickers) for hisher participation. 
Videotaping 
Many of the behaviors that we are looking for are often difficult to identify since 
they do not last very long (such as a smile or frown, hand and body movements, and eye 
contact). To find which children show these behaviors, it will be necessary to use a 
videocamera. The videocamera will be placed in a room across the hall from the testing 
room, and the door of the room will remain open throughout the study. The room is 
equipped with a one-way mirror. Parents are invited to watch their child fiom behind this 
one-way mirror if they wish to see how their child reacts to this session. The videotape of 
your child will later be coded by student raters, who will not know your child. These 
raters will look at short clips of the videotape to find the number of times that certain 
behaviors happen. 
Confidentiality 
Any information that is gathered about your child will be identified only with a 
confidential numerical identification code, which will be known only by me. No other 
identifying marks or names will be attached to any information that you or your child's 
teacher provides. All information about your child will be stored in a locked office. The 
data that you provide will only be used for the present study, and all ID codes and 
videotapes will be destroyed when the study is completed. Some parents may be 
contacted to get permission to use the tape for future educational purposes, but videotapes 
will not be used unless express permission is given at that time. All other videotapes will 
be destroyed when the study is completed. 
Questionnaire Packet 
In this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaire with questions about 
your child's reactions to several types of everyday happenings. Please remember that 
although you may want to answer these questions so that you and your child appear in the 
best light, it is helpful if you answer these questions as truthfully and objectively as 
possible. You may skip any question you do not want to answer. You will be asked to rate 
how much you agree with questions about your child, such as: my child "may 'freeze' in 
place when caught doing something bad,' and "will spontaneously say 'sorry' after having 
done something wrong." This questionnaire will take about half an hour to complete. 
So that I can understand how your child acts outside the home, I will also be 
asking your child's teacher to fill out one questionnaire about how your child acts in the 
classroom. For example, teachers will be asked how often your child "delights in playing 
with other children" and "goes unnoticed in a group." 
Risks and Benefits 
The researchers that will be conducting these sessions will all have considerable 
experience with children of this age. We will strive to put your child at ease in this novel 
situation and provide positive feedback to hinw'her. We hope that our attempts to make 
these activities fun and interesting will be successful. Children generally enjoy the 
individual attention that they receive in these sessions, and also enjoy the chance to get a 
small prize. Finally, these methods have been used in many research studies, and there 
are no known side effects associated with them. We will end the session if your child 
seems distressed, and we will quickly resolve any reactions by explaining that the toy was 
already broken, and by showing the child the toy is easy to fix. 







You may also contact: 
Peter LaFreniere, Ph.D. 
Director, Child Study Center 
Professor of Psychology 
58 1 -2044 
Pennission Form 
I have read the Informed Consent Form, and I understand that all the data will be 
identified only with a confidential ID code number that will be known only by the 
primary investigator. All sessions will be conducted by an adult known to my child, and 
my child will be told that helshe can withdraw at any time. The short videotape will be 
viewed only by the primary investigator and student coders that do not know the children. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary. I give permission for my child to 
participate in the study in the manner that it has been described to me and for my child's 
teacher to complete one questionnaire about my child. I understand that I will also be 
asked to fill out a questionnaire. 
Name: 
Signature: 
Your relationship to the child: 
Date: 
Phone Number: (optional) 
Appendix B 
My Child 
PLEASE READ THIS PAGE BEFORE STARTING 
You will see descriptions of young children's behaviors in typical daily situations. Many 
refer to children's reactions when they get into mischief, and are very common for 
toddlers and preschoolers. Please tell us how true each description is for your child. 
Circle # If the statement is: 
1 Extremely untrue of your child; s h e  would be extremely 
unlikely to react in this way in this situation; not at all 
characteristic of h i h e r  
Quite untrue of your child; s h e  would be very unlikely to react in 
this way in this situation 
Slightly untrue of your child; she  would be rather unlikely to 
react 
in this way in this situation 
May be true, may be untrue; neither true or untrue of your 
child's reaction in this situation; maybe 
Slightly true of your child; she  would be rather likely to react in 
this way in this situation 
Quite true of your child; she  would be very likely to react in this 
way in this situation 
Extremely true of your child; s h e  would be extremely likely to 
react in this way in this situation; very characteristic of h i h e r  
All answers are OK; all behaviors described here are normal and common. Young 
children differ very much in how they respond to different situations. Also, 
children of different ages behave very differently. For example, most 2-year-olds 
get into trouble or mischief when unsupervised. These individual and age 
differences are exactly what we are studying. 
Please circle NA only if you cannot remember your child ever being in this situation; 
for example, of the description says "Rarely cries or looks upset when watching a sad TV 
show", and your child never watches TV. However, most situations are typical for all 
young children; most parents will rarely need to circle NA. 
PLEASE BE SURE TO READ EACH ITEM VERY CAREFULLY 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue true nor true true true 
untrue 
1. Will try to comfort or reassure another in distress. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
2. Is likely to scold another child who violates a household rule. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
3. Not particularly concerned or worried when s h e  was broken a valuable object. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
4. Likely to offer toys or candy to a crying playmate even without parental suggestion. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
5. Likely to try a prohibited but attractive activity when alone. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
6. Will spontaneously clean up toys, even without being asked. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
7. May "freeze" in place when caught doing something bad. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
8. Will spontaneously say "sorry" after having done something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
9. May deny that s h e  did something wrong even if confronted with the evidence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
10. If asked to do something tedious (for example, clean up hisher toys), s h e  is likely to 
complete the task without further supervision. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
1 1. May occasionally tease a pet if unsupervised. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue true nor true true true 
untrue 
....................................................................... 
12. When s h e  does something naughty, this subject of wrongdoing is likely to come up 
during hisher play. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
13. Feels good when good things happen to movie characters. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
14. During "pretend" play with peers, may re-enact themes of wrongdoing or mischief 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
15. Remembers for a long time past mishaps or instances when s h e  did something 
wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
16. Unless specifically asked to do so, she  is not likely to apologize on hisher own. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
17. Acts upset when s h e  sees a hurt animal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
18. Likely to feel responsible whenever anything goes wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
19. Likely to look remorseful or guilty when caught in the middle of a forbidden activity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
20. After doing something naughty, may replay that situation with toys. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
2 1. Does not seem upset when s h e  breaks a new toy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
22. Has to be reminded to say "sorry" when s h e  has done something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
23. When s h e  has hurt a playmate, will try to make up for it by offering toys or prized 
possession to the other child. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue truenor true true true 
untrue 
....................................................................... 
24. Likely to become quiet or subdued after doing something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
25. Feels bad when reminded about past mischief or wrong doing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
26. Shows concern or makes a comment when comes to a tom page in a book. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
27. May have trouble sleeping or poor appetite after having done something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
28. During play, will introduce themes of wrongdoing or rules (for example, scold a teddy 
bear for being naughty). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
29. Rarely cries or looks upset when watching a sad TV show. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
30. It is easy to bring himher to tears when discussing something that s h e  has done 
wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
3 1. Even attractively wrapped presents can be left within hisher reach because s h e  is not 
likely to tamper with them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
32. Rarely repeats previously prohibited behavior even if adult is not present. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
33. Likely to show spontaneous nurturing and care-giving behavior towards an animal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
34. Seems relieved when given an opportunity to repair a damage s h e  has caused. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
35. It is enough to prohlbit something once and s h e  will probably not do it even when 
alone. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue truenor true true true 
untrue 
....................................................................... 
36. May confess to doing something naughty even if unlikely to be found out. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
37. After having been naughty, seems to want reassurance that parent is no longer angry 
with himher. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
38. Is upset by criticism. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
39. Shows interest when TV or story characters act naughty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
40. Hisher feelings are not easily hurt by criticism. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
41. Will try to stop another child from getting into trouble. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
42. Can tell at just a glance how others are feeling. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
43. Not likely to react when a visiting friend breaks a household rule. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
44. If left alone with another child, will not try to keep them both out of trouble. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
45. When watching TV or listening to a story, seems particularly interested in issues of 
responsibility, wrongdoing, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
46. Shows concern when a toy is broken. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
47. May continue to feel bad even if forgiven for a mishap or blunder. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue truenor true true true 
untrue 
48. Not particularly likely to offer to clean up if s h e  has caused a mess (for example, a 
spill). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
49. On hisher own, is likely to promise not to do it again after doing something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
50. After having done something naughty, asks to be forgiven. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
5 1. Does not need to be reminded to say "sorry" when s h e  does something bad. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
52. If out of a parent's sight, may ignore a household rule. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
53. If asked to do a chore (for example, help set the table), s h e  does not need to be 
reminded about it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
54. Can stop herhimself in the middle of doing something forbidden without any 
intervention from an adult. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
55. Gets upset when a guest breaks a household rule. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
56. After being scolded for some mischief, seems particularly happy when parent praises 
h i d e r  for some accomplishment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
57. Is not overly concerned about being forgiven after having done something naughty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue true nor true true true 
untrue 
....................................................................... 
58. Likely to ask "what's wrong?" when seeing someone in distress. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
59. Will spontaneously say "sorry" to a playmate or sibling when necessary. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
60. If not supervised, may get sloppy about hisher chores. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
61. It is not easy to make himher feel bad after s h e  has done something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
62. On hisher own, will rarely pick up things that are out of place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
63. Seems happy after doing a good job with a task or chore, even before others 
comment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
64. When s h e  does something wrong, seems to feel relieved when forgiven. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
65. Gets angry at aggressor, "Bad Guy", who hurts a TV character. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
66. Not likely to pay attention to or comment on dirty or tom clothing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
67. Will spontaneously admit fault or wrongdoing, either verbally or nonverbally. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
68. Tries hisher best when doing chores. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
69. If asked to do something, may not finish if not reminded. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue true nor true true true 
untrue 
70. Not too upset by mishaps or accidents s h e  has caused (for example, spilling or 
breaking something). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
7 1. Eager to make amends for doing something naughty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
72. May draw parent's attention to mishap or damage s h e  has caused (for example, 
"Mark done it" or "broke"). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
73. On hisher own, will share household rules with a playmate at our home (for example, 
what is not allowed in the house). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
74. After breaking something, doesn't seem particularly concerned about fixing the 
damage. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
75. Is upset by stories in which characters are hurt or die. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
76. Presents have to be well hidden because s h e  will tamper with them if left alone. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
77. Clearly hesitates before doing something forbidden, even when alone. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
78. Seems relieved after s h e  has confessed to a wrongdoing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
79. AAer doing something s h e  is not supposed to do, may later check with parent to see 
if s h e  is "good now". 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
80. May become extra nice toward the parent after being caught doing something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
untrue untrue untrue true nor true true true 
untrue 
8 1 .  When s h e  as caused some damage (for example, dropped or broken an object), will 
try to put the pieces together, clean up, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
82. When s h e  breaks a toy during play, simply moves to another activity or other toys. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
83. Seems compelled to tell parents when s h e  does something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
84. Shows interest when other people's wrongdoing is discussed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
85. In play, may scold a doll or stuffed toy for imaginary wrongdoing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
86. May not tell parent's when s h e  has broken something. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
87. Likely to get into mischief when no adult is present. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
88. Will feel sorry for other people who are hurt, sick, or unhappy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
89. Will not complete a tedious task (for example, cleaning up hisher room), unless 
reminded. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
90. When unsupervised, is likely to stop himherself on hisher own when just about to do 
something wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N A  
9 1 .  Likely to blush when caught doing something wrong. 
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92. Can be left alone even with hisher favorite dessert and will not touch it if asked to 
wait until the guests arrive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
93. When having a fiend over, is not likely to enforce family rules on hisher own. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
94. Wants to stay physically closer to parent after being scolded for doing something 
wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
95. Pays attention to objects that are broken, do not work, or out of order (for example, 
missing buttons, broken toys, stained clothes, etc.). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
96. Avoids eye contact if s h e  has done something naughty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
97. Is not likely to become upset if a playmate cries. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
98. Is casual about spills or damages that s h e  has caused (for example, may suggest that 
the spill will dry by itself). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
99. May hang hisher head and look down after being naughty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
100. Likely to get upset if s h e  does something wrong in public. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Appendix C 
Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation-Preschool Edition 
Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation-Preschool Edition 
The following is a list of statements describing a child in three broad categories: 
emotional adjustment, social interactions with peers, and social interactions with adults. 
Use the following scale to rate the child by circling one choice for each statement to 
indicate the child's typical behavior or emotional state. Each of the ratings indicates how 
often a typical emotional state or behavior occurs: 
Rating Description 
1 Almost NEVER occurs. 
2 or 3 SOMETIMES occurs. 
4 o r 5  OFTEN occurs. 
6 Almost ALWAYS occurs. 
Make every effort to assign a rating to each statement; leave an item blank only if 
you have no way of evaluating the child on the particular statement. If more than a few 
items are left without any ratings, the results may not be meaningful. 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
1. Enjoys demonstrating new songs, games and 
other things helshe has learned.. ................................ 1.. .2.. . 3 . .  .4.. .5.. .6 
2. Maintains neutral facial expression (doesn't smile or laugh). .. 1 .. .2.. . 3 . .  .4.. .5.. .6 
3. Sensitive to another's problems.. .................................. 1 .. .2.. . 3 . .  .4.. .5.. .6 
. . ..................................... 4. Wets or dirties pants at school.. 1. .2. .3.. .4.. .5.. .6 
5. Curious.. ................................................................ 1.. .2.. .3.. .4.. .5.. .6 
6. Tired.. ................................................................. 1.. -2.. -3.. -4.. -5.. .6 
. . . . 7. Easily frustrated. ....................................................... . l .  .2. .3. -4. -5.. -6 
. 8. Gets angry when interrupted.. ........................................ . l .  .2.. .3.. .4.. .5.. .6 
. . . . 9. Looks directly at you when speaking.. .............................. . l .  .2. .3.. .4. .5. .6 
. 10. Irritable, gets mad easily.. ............................................. . l .  .2.. .3 . .  .4.. .5.. .6 
.. . . . . 1 1. Worries. ................................................................... 1 -2. -3 .  -4. .5. .6 
. . . . . 12. Laughs easily. ........................................................... . l .  .2. -3 .  .4. .5. .6 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
. . .. ... . ... 13 Easily adjusts to new situations ........................................ 1. .2 .3 4. .5 6 
. .. .. .. ... 14 . Gets bored quickly and appears uninterested in playing ............ 1. .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 15 . In a good mood ......................................................... .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 16 . Patient and tolerant ................................................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
17 . Takes pleasure in own accomplishments ........................... 1 ... 2. .. 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 18 . Tolerates interruptions and disturbances ........................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
... .. . ... .. 19 . Difficult to console when helshe cries .............................. 1 2. 3. .4 5. 6 
20 . Self-confident .......................................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
. 2 1 Explores hisher environment ........................................ 1 .. .2 ... 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 22 . Readily adapts to difficulties ......................................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
23 . Timid, afraid (e.g., avoids new situations) ........................ 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
24 . Sad, unhappy or depressed .......................................... 1 ... 2. .. 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
25 . Anxious, nervous (e.g., bites fingernails) .......................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 26 . Active. ready to play ................................................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
27 . Whines or complains easily .......................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
28 . Inhibited or uneasy in the group .................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
29 . Listens attentively when spoken to ................................. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
30 . Screams or yells easily ................................................ 1 ... 2. . .3 ... 4. .. 5. .. 6 
3 1 . Bullies weaker children ............................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
32 . Forces other children to do things they don't want to do ........ 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
33 . Gets upset when the teacher attends to another child ............ 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
142 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
.. .. .. .. ... 34 . Inactive. watches the other children play ........................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
35 . Negotiates solutions to conflicts with other children .............. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
36 . Remains apart, isolated fkom the group ............................. 1 ... 2. .. 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
37 . Children seek himher out to play with them ....................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
38 . Does not respond to other children's invitations to play ......... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
39 . Takes other children and their point of view into account ....... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
40 . Self-centered, does not recognize other children's interests ..... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
41 . Is involved wherever the children are having lots of fun ......... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
42 . Hits, bites or kicks other children ................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
... 1 2...3...4...5... 6 
1 ... 2...3...4...5... 6 
. 1 ... 2...3...4...5... 6 
............... 43 . Cooperates with other children in group activities 
.............................. 44 . Gets into conflict with other children 
.................... 45 . Comforts or assists another child in difficulty 
46 . Has to be first .......................................................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
47 . Refuses to share toys .................................................. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
.. .. .. .. ... 48 . Takes care of toys .................................................... 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
49 . Doesn't talk or interact during group activities .................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
50 . Attentive towards younger children ................................. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
5 1 . Stays calm when there are conflicts in the group .................. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
52 . Initiates or proposes games to other children ...................... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
53 . Spontaneously apologized to other children for 
causing a problem ..................................................... 1 ... 2. .. 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
............................................ .. .. .. ... . .. 54 Makes games competitive 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
55 . Spontaneously helps a child pick up toys or other objects ....... 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
............................. 56 . Delights in playing with other children 1 ... 2. . .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
.. .. ........................................... ... .. .. 57 . Goes unnoticed in a group 1 2. 3. 4. 5. 6 
............................................... .. .. .. ... 58 . Works easily in groups 1 .. .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
........................... ... . ... . ... 59 . Takes pleasure in hurting other children 1 2. .3 4. .5 6 
..................................... .. .. ... .. . .. 60 Shares toys with other children 1 .2 .3 .4 5. 6 
61 . Recovers quickly when helshe falls or hurts self 
.............................................. .. . ... (Doesn't cry very long) 1 ... 2. 3. .4 5. .. 6 
62 . Hits teacher or destroys things when angry with teacher ........ 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
.. 63 . Helps with everyday tasks (e.g., distributing snacks) ............ 1 .. .2 .3 .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
................................. 64 . Persistent in solving own problems 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
.............................................. 65 . Disrespecthl of teacher 1 ... 2. . .3 ... 4. .. 5 ... 6 
.................... .. .. ... . .. 66 Accepts compromises when reasons are given 1 .2 .3 .4 ... 5 6 
................... .. .. ... 67 . Clear and direct when helshe wants something 1 .. .2 .3 .4 ... 5 6 
............................. 68 . Stops talking immediately when asked 1 ... 2. . .3 ... 4. .. 5. .. 6 
......................... . 69 . Needs teacher's presence to h c t i o n  well 1 ... 2. .. 3. .4 ... 5. .. 6 
70 . Asks for help when it is unnecessary ................................ 1 ... 2. .. 3. . .4 ... 5. .. 6 
.................................. 7 1 . Opposes the teacher's suggestions 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
......................................... 72 . Cries for no apparent reason 1 ... 2. .. 3. .. 4. .. 5. .. 6 
73 . Is autonomous and able to organize himherself .................. 1 .. .2 .. .3 .. .4 .. .5 ... 6 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
........................................... ... .. .. . ... . 74 Defiant when reprimanded 1 2. 3 .  4. .5 6 
.. .. ...... .. .. ... 75 . Cling towards teacher in novel situations (e.g., field trip) 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
.................... 76 . Takes initiative in situations with new people .1 .. .2 .. .3  .. .4 ... 5 ... 6 
........... .. .. .. .. ... 77 . Ignores directives and continues what helshe is doing 1 .2 .3  .4 .5 6 
.................... .. .. .. .. ... . 78 Accepts teacher's involvement in own activity 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 6 
............................................. ... .. . ... .. . 79 Cries when parent leaves 1 2. 3 .  .4 5. 6 
.................................... ... .. . ... .. 80 . Asks permission when necessary 1 2. 3 .  .4 5. 6 
Appendix D 
Verbal Directions Given by the Experimenter 
1. Ambiguous Responsibility. "You can play with Elmo while I take care of some things 
in the other room. I think he might be broken, so take good care of him because he is my 
favorite toy". 
2. Personal Responsibility. "You can play with Elmo while I take care of some things in 
the other room, but take good care of him because he is my favorite toy". 
3. Both Conditions. (One minute after the experimenter returns to the room). "What do 
you think happened to make Elmo's am1 come off?" (Experimenter pauses for child's 
response). "That's too bad, Elmo is my favorite toy." (Experimenter again pauses). "It's 
OK, Elmo was already broken, so it's not your fault." (The experimenter will continue to 
reassure the child if necessary). 
Appendix E 
Coding System for Emotional and Behavioral Responses 
Coding System 
Three periods will be coded for each subject and coders will rate the overall emotional 
reactions. 
1. Final minute of warm-up period: This will be coded from one minute prior to when 
the experimenter begins to put Elmo back into the toy box. This period should end 
when the experimenter says that she has to get somethingldo some work in the other 
room. 
2. Experimental Condition: This will be coded when the child first notices that Elmo's 
arm is broken. This period ends when the experimenter first returns to the room. In 
some instances, the experimenter will return briefly to remind the child to play with 
the doll. In these cases, coding should not take place until after the experimenter 
leaves and the toy breaks. This period will also end if the child leaves the room. 
3. Post Experiment: Coding will begin when the experimenter returns to the room and 
is sitting at the table with the child. If the child has left the room, coding begins when 
the child and experimenter return to the room. This period has two parts: 
1) Before prompt: when the experimenter first enters, and 
2) After prompt: when the experimenter prompts the child by saying "What 
happened to make Elmo's arm fall off' and "That's too bad, he's my favorite toy. 
Coding ends when the experimenter tells the child that the toy was already broken. 
For example, the experimenter may say, "I think I made a mistake." 
4. Overall Emotional Reaction: This is coded from the beginning for period 2 
(experimental condition) to the end of period 3 (post experiment). 
For each period, behaviors and emotions will be coded as listed on the coding sheets. 
Please be sure to record all instances of these emotional expressions and behaviors when 
they occur. Finally, it is important that you not try to form hypotheses about these 
behaviors and emotions. These codes will be used in ways that are not evident simply 
from viewing these tapes. 
Operational Definitions of Behavioral Codes 
Behavioral Measure Definition 
Latency to repair 
Repairing the arm 
Latency to comment 
"Telling" E about the a m  










Number of seconds before attempting to repair the toy 
Tries to fix the arm, whether the child is successfU1 or not 
Number of seconds before verbalizing that the toy is broken 
Deliberately shows the E the broken arm and/or 
verbalizes that the arm is broken 
Number of seconds before the child looks at the 
experimenter's face. This does not include when the door 
first opens or when the experimenter first returns to the 
room. 
Looking at E then looking away toward any insignificant 
object (i.e., not at the toy). This includes looking at the 
ceiling, toward a comer, or at their laps. 
Number of seconds with body turned away from the toy. 
Moves body fiom the direction of the toy. 
Number of seconds with body turned away fiom 
experimenter after the experimenter re-enters the room 
Number of occurrences where the child tries to leave room 
or asks to leave the room. 
Number of occurrences where the child hugs, kisses, or pats 
the toy 
Number of occurrences where the child pushes, throws, or 
tries to destroy the toy 
Denies responsibility for the mishap. Acts as though or says 
that the toy still works and/or says that they "Didn't do it," 
or claims that something else is responsible (e.g., makes up 
an excuse). 
Child explains that the toy is broken, says "I broke" or "I 
pulled his arm off' 
Thumb sucking, finger in mouth, biting lips 
Operational Definitions of Emotion Codes 
Affective 
Category Facial Vocal Postural 
JOY smiling, wrinkling 
around eyes 
Anger narrowed eyes, lips 
pressed and narrow 
Sadness eyes lowered, lips 
turned down 
Tension/ alert, nervous twitches, 
worry tense facial muscles, 
brow may be lowered, 
eyes may shift rapidly 
















fidgety, tense posture, 
may get up from chair 
calm, attentive 
Overall Rating: Rate the overall quality of the child's emotional reaction to the 
experiment and the prompting of the experimenter. Rate each child according to either of 
the following 2 categories, but not both: 
a. Regulated affect 
b. Dysregulated affect 
Regulated affect - emotion that contributes to the continuation or flow of activity. 







Final minute of warm-up period 
Seconds 
Gaze Aversion (seconds) 
Avoiding E (seconds) 
GENDER 



























Seconds I Mild/Full 
beconds Code l Occurrences 
Total Time 
Latency to gaze Aggression I 
I 
Leave 
Latency to comment 
Toy avoidance I 
I I 
Affection 





before prompt Y N 
after prompt Y N 
Confess 
before prompt Y N 
after prompt Y N 
Overall Rating of Emotional Reactions 
(circle one) 
Regulated Dysregulated 
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